Similarities Between St. Thomas and Nietzsche on Morality
Introduction
Friedrich Nietzsche and St. Thomas Aquinas are thinkers who are
very different from each other. They could be contrasted from each other in a
plethora of ways. However, in this paper, I want to explore what they have in
common as it pertains to the study of ethics. I will be drawing from a chapter
in Nietzsche’s A Twilight of Idols,[1] which is called Morality as Anti-Nature and
from St. Thomas’s Summa Theologiae[2]
to do this. And so, the goal of this paper is to compare the thought of
Nietzsche to Aquinas as it pertains to Nietzsche’s view of morality.
Comparisons
The first comparison between the two
thinkers is that both agree that passions can lead to bad decisions. Nietzsche
actually begins this work with this admission. He says, “all passions have a
phase when they are merely disastrous, when they drag down their victim with
the weight of stupidity.”[3]
Later in the work, he returns to this theme by saying that those who wish to
reject the passions because of their lack of moderation demonstrate their
weakness.[4]
The point, for now, is that he is acknowledging that the passions can have
negative consequences. St. Thomas Aquinas agrees with this perspective. He
holds that the passions themselves are morally neutral, it’s how they interact
with reason that determines their goodness and badness.[5]
A second comparison follows from
this one. Namely, that since the passions can have negative consequences we are
left with 2 options.[6]
First, we can cut ourselves off entirely from passions. Nietzsche compares this
to castration, in that it looks to destroy a good out of a misplaced sense of
self-control. The second option is to spiritualize the passions or use them
towards building ourselves to be stronger. Nietzsche thinks that Christianity
embodies the first view, because of its desire to cast out temptations which
come from passions.[7]
I think that St. Thomas agrees with
Nietzsche that the passions need to be spiritualized. One piece of evidence for
this is the size of the section of the Summa dealing with the passions. It is
one of the largest sections in the entire work. This goes to show that St.
Thomas did not think that the passions were evil to be cut down, but rather
that they are a vital part of human life. In addition to the volume of this
section, the actual text bears this out as well. St. Thomas asks the question:
Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?[8]
Nietzsche would likely assume that he would answer in the negative. However,
St. Thomas says, “it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate
to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of
reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the
bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive
appetite to its proper regulated movements.” We see that he answers in the
affirmative. That the passions are required for executing virtue. Since
passions are an important part of the human person, to do the virtuous thing
without the passions, is not fully human of fully virtuous. “For Aquinas, the
virtuous person is someone who knows the moral thing to do, does it in the
right way, and takes delight in doing it.”[9]
Notice how delight (a passion) is a core ingredient in moral action.
Additional evidence can be given from
the sections on virtue in the Summa. St. Thomas treats of specific virtues and
actions which ensure that the passions are in tune with reason, rather than
completely unchecked. The most important example is the virtue of temperance.[10]
This is the virtue whereby we order our desires of sensuality to reason. At no
point does St. Thomas call for them to be cut off or removed, rather they are
to be incorporated, or in Nietzsche’s language: spiritualized.
One last piece of evidence from St.
Thomas that shows his congruence with Nietzsche on this point is his treatment
of fasting. Contrary to Nietzsche’s claim that Christianity is incapable of
spiritualizing the passions towards human flourishing, Aquinas treats this as
the main purpose of fasting.[11]
Nietzsche considered the epitome of Christian virtue to be the person who
denies his impulses the most, “the saint in whom God delights is the ideal
eunuch.”[12]
As Saint Thomas is getting at here, for the Christian these penitential acts of
fasting, and chastity are not meant to destroy our ability to feel the
passions. Rather, they are meant to bring them into a supernatural light. We
see here that rather than being at odds over whether we should spiritualize our
passions, St. Thomas seems to agree with Nietzsche on this point, even though
their understandings of what that looks like differ.
The third similarity has to do with
particular impulses that Nietzsche wants to hold up. These are sensuality and
hostility.[13]
His claim is that these are noble goods that Christianity wrongfully abhors. He
goes on to give the examples of political disputes which make both parties
stronger, and war in which he says that “one has renounced the great life when
one renounces war.”[14]
For Nietzsche, the meaningful life is a life of strength, in which persons
allow their impulses to come to fruition.
Although
St. Thomas wouldn’t fully endorse the view that impulses should be allowed to
run wild, he does agree that there are merits to these human desires. Of
sexuality,[15]
he considers the pleasure to be of major importance in the friendship between
married persons. Of hostility,[16]
he considers passions like anger to be neutral, and actions of vengeance to be
virtuous. For, St. Thomas anger is not an evil thing that should be spurned.
Rather, it is a natural expression in the face of injustice. We should be angry
at injustices. However, it should be cautioned that although these are considered
goods for St. Thomas, they need to be moderated by reason. As we have seen, all
passions are morally neutral. The question is whether they are exercised in
accord with reason or not that gives them merit.
The last comparison involves the correlation
between morality and nature. Both thinkers express the view that morality
involves living in accord with our nature. Nietzsche says, “every naturalism is
morality, that is…dominated by an instinct of life.”[17]
Aquinas expresses a similar view,[18]
that the goodness and badness of an action, for man, depends on its being
conformed to his nature (rational). So, we see that both thinkers agree that
morality involves measuring an action against the nature of the thing acting.
The point of departure is that Aquinas posits human nature to the
distinguishing characteristic of being rational. Nietzsche thinks that human
nature involves the impulses or passions that are experienced. He says, “the
roots of passion means…the roots of life.”[19]
Conclusion
We have seen that although these two
thinkers have vastly different worldviews, they have many similarities in their
views of morality, or ethics. They both hold that the passions can lead to poor
decisions. They both think that they healthy alternative to cutting yourself
off from passions is to incorporate them into a well-functioning life. They
also are similar in holding that passions like sensuality and hostility can be
meritorious. And finally, both thinkers think that morality is largely
connected with living in accord with our nature, although they dispute what
that nature is.
[1]
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Morality as Anti
Nature, found at https://www.wolfe.k12.ky.us/userfiles/1009/friedrich%20nietzsche.pdf.
[2]
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae, found
at https://www.newadvent.org/summa/
[3]
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Morality, Section
1, Paragraph 1.
[4]
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Morality, Section
2, Paragraph 3.
[5]
Aquinas, Thomas. ST, I-II, 24, 1.
[6]
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Morality, Section
1, Paragraphs 1-2.
[7]
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Morality,
Section 1, Paragraph 2.
[8]
Aquinas, Thomas. ST, I-II, 59, 5.
[9]
Petri OP, Thomas, Thomism of the Body
Lecture, found at https://soundcloud.com/thomisticinstitute/thomism-of-the-body-fr-thomas-petri
[10]
Aquinas, Thomas, ST, II-II, 141, 3-4.
[11]
Aquinas, Thomas, ST, II-II, 137, 1,
ad 2-3.
[12]
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morality, Section
4, Paragraph 8.
[13]
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morality, Section
3, Paragraph 5.
[14]
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morality, Section
3, Paragraph 6.
[15] Aristotle
and Aquinas, Thomas. _Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics_, 1723. Trans.
C.J. Litzinger, O.P. Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books,
1964. Print. 524.
[16]
Aquinas, Thomas, ST, II-II, 108, 2.
[17]
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morality, Section
4, paragraph 8.
[18]
Aquinas, Thomas, ST, I-II, 18, 5.
[19]
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morality, Section
1, Paragraph 2.
