Critique of Rosemary Ruether's Defense of Contraception

Critique of Rosemary Ruether's “Birth Control and the Ideals of Marital Sexuality”

Summary of Ruether Essay

I will begin my critique by summarizing the text as strongly as I can. Ruether begins by explaining how many of the terms of this debate are muddy. She cites how terms like relational value and formal cause of procreation are read in different ways by both sides of the debate. She goes on to describe the purposes of marriage. She thinks there are two: procreation and unity of the spouses. Next, she describes the ideals of both of these ends of marriage. These are successful procreation during the sexual act for the first end, and total free and loving exchange between the spouses during every sexual act for the second end. Next, she describes reasons why these ideals are unreachable in the world. After this, she goes on to describe the different means of avoiding pregnancy and how they each fit with the two ends of marriage. She begins this section by removing total abstinence (when not intending to have children) from the table. She argues that not only is this largely impossible, it's bad for both ends of marriage. Unitive is rather obvious: the couple is refraining from sexual union. But also the procreative end, because procreation and education go hand in hand. When the unitive bond between spouses is broken, the nurturing aspect of education is also broken. 

It's clear then that some form of contraception is necessary. It is unhealthy for spouses to refuse sexual communion for long periods of time. The four options are sterilization, temporal contraception, technological contraception, and medicinal contraception. Sterilization is off the table because it is permanent. It removes the freedom to choose life in the future. Temporal contraception, like the rhythm method, is impersonal, anxiety inducing and ineffective. Technological contraception has the drawback of being “aesthetically distasteful.” However some technological means allow for the act to reach completion, so these seem better. Also it's not clear to Ruether how this distastefulness is unnatural. Rather, it seems more like an aid (like reading spectacles). 

She concludes the essay by describing further flaws in the rhythm method. I view this section as largely seeking to respond to the arguments from the pulpit. She views the argument that the rhythm method as an ascetic discipline is problematic and misplaced coming from clergy. She also describes how the refusal of contraception makes Catholics sex obsessed. And lastly, she concludes with a clever image: to refuse to smile when you are happy is simply not healthy. 

I think that this is a thoughtful and well written defense of the use of oral and technological contraceptives. Her description of the rhythm method as a temporal contraception is clever. I also think her consideration that the ideals of marriage are very difficult to achieve should be taken seriously. Despite her thoughtfulness, I ultimately disagree with her fundamental points. I will now critique Ruether’s Essay.  

Critique of Ruether Essay

I think there are several serious problems in this essay. First, I think Ruether is wrong to assume that marriage has two ends. Second, Ruether uses a conception of freedom that is misguided. Third, the view that because the ideals are arduous, so we should lighten them, is not a good argument. Fourth, her subtle critiques of natural law miss the mark. Fifth, she holds a consequentialist view that evil may be done if it bears good fruits. Sixth, she holds that the rhythm method is a form of contraception. I will expound on each of these points. 

The first and fundamental mistake that Ruether makes is assuming that marriage has two ends. This is a common trope today even from within the Catholic Church. I think Aquinas has a better explanation of the nature of marriage. St. Thomas argues that “the form of matrimony consists in a certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered. And the end of matrimony is the begetting and upbringing of children: the first of which is attained by conjugal intercourse: the second by the other duties of husband and wife, by which they help one another in rearing their offspring.” We see here that the union of spouses is not a goal of the marriage, it is the form, essence or nature of the marriage. It’s what a marriage is! The goal is to beget and educate offspring from this union. 

Notice that Aquinas does hold that the union of spouses is attained by intercourse. However, since this is the form of the marriage and not an end, it doesn’t need to be continually sought for a marriage to thrive. Rather, the couple should be aiming at begetting and raising offspring to the worship of God. Instead of viewing a marriage as something seeking unity, we should view it as a unity seeking children and their proper rearing. While defending this view would require exploring and defending Aristotle’s four causes, at the very least this alternative is just as viable as the one she assumes. At the most, it casts serious doubt on her heavy leaning on the unitive aspect of marriage over and above the procreative aspect. 

A second problem in Ruether’s essay is her use of the term freedom. I think page 78 is a clear example of this. Ruther describes how using contraception is the only way that a married person can be free, since they are having children only when they concretely choose to. This view of freedom follows what Servais Pinckaers calls “freedom of indifference.” In essence, it's the view of freedom as not tied to human happiness, but rather as freedom from external influences. In this view I am free to play the piano when I don’t have conditions which prevent me from playing the piano. This is Ruethers vision of freedom. Nature and economic situations are all impediments to me choosing what I want. My will imposes itself on reality. In the context of marriage, then, my partner and I should have total control over when children come about from our sexual union, without the inhibitions of morality, economics, or human nature. 

This contrasts with “freedom for excellence.” In this freedom, in real freedom, we are tied to human nature and to what will make us happy. Being constrained by the circumstances of human existence is not an enemy of freedom, rather it is the condition for it. Only because we were made a certain kind of thing with particular ends can we become more and more excellent. Returning to the piano example, I am free to play the piano only if I have trained and perfected my abilities as a pianist. In the same way, I am free to have and raise a child excellently when I submit to the realities of human nature and have grown and perfected my own human abilities. Rather than trying to control my situation, I submit to the Providence of the God who governs all things down to the existence of every moment, and have children according to the excellences I have achieved through growth in virtues. By exercising virtues, spouses work together to have children as they see appropriate and through appropriate means. This is living a marriage excellently. This is a free marriage. 

A third problem with Ruethers essay is her view that because we are not able to reach the ideals of marriage, we need to lighten the means to reach these ideals is mistaken. In no other situation does this line of reasoning work. Imagine a person who reasons: it is difficult to reach the ideal of telling the truth, so I must be able to lie in situations where it's really difficult to tell the truth. We would judge that person’s reasoning to be mistaken. Ruether is correct that it is difficult for married couples to balance having children in a virtuous way and being intimate to a satisfactory degree. It doesn’t follow from this that we can use illegitimate means to balance these things though. Rather, we should seek to grow in virtue so as to balance these things appropriately. It is interesting that she describes a comfortable amount of children at her time (1964) as between two and five children. As contraception has become more and more accepted in society, this number has shrunk dramatically. Most families have less than 2 children. In addition, marriages have suffered, divorce has become widely prevalent and pornography is used by a large percentage of people. Perhaps her argument can be flipped on its head. Even under the ideal circumstances of a contraceptive heavy culture, humans are too selfish to use the tool appropriately, and so we shouldn’t bother. 

Ruether has another problem, though. While she doesn’t address natural law theory directly, she makes a couple subtle jabs at it. I’m thinking of two places in particular. First, in her defense of traditional contraceptives, she compares them to an aid like reading glasses. Second, in her conclusion, she describes how unhealthy it would be to refuse to smile when one is happy. This is an analogy pointing to the absurdity of squelching natural desires for intimacy because of ethical norms. Towards the first point, I think Ruether just flat misses the mark. Contraception is not an aid towards the ends of marriage (presupposing that there are two). The purpose of contraception is to prevent conception, which is the primary end of the marital act. It would be akin to saying that ear plugs are aids in hearing. Towards the second point, I will respond in the following way. Human beings are rational animals. Smiling, or feelings of happiness, are parts of our animal nature. Since the rational nature is higher, it governs the lower parts of our nature. There are circumstances where it isn’t appropriate to smile. If someone tells you a funny joke during a funeral, it is appropriate to hold that smile back. Reason should govern over the passions. In the same way, if prudence demands abstaining from sexual intercourse for a valid reason, it should govern the passion of sexual intimacy which comes from our animal nature. To be clear, I am not saying that our animal instincts and natures are bad, just that they need to be governed by our higher rational nature. 

The fifth problem that I find with Ruether’s essay is that she is expressing a consequentialist view of the matter. She leaves the question of whether contraception is licit off the table. Rather, she is seeking to see which route will have the best consequences. This is not how one should proceed in ethics. The primary judgment in an ethical question is: is this action right or wrong? It is not for us to decide what consequences are best. We may never do evil that good may come. We aren’t that good at judging the future anyways. Rather, we should start with asking whether an action is in keeping with human nature or not, and then proceeding to the more circumstantial elements. Contraception is wrong because it cuts against the purpose of sexual union. It is a violation of human nature. Even using consequentialist reasoning though, we have seen multiple decades now of widespread contraceptive use. The results have been disastrous. People don’t want to get married, marriages don’t last, marriages don’t produce as many children, use of pornography is rampant, and females are seen as objects for gratification widely in first world cultures. These are not good consequences. 

A 6th problem in this essay is that Rosemary Ruether holds that the Rhythm Method is a form of contraception. This can be seen in her list of types of birth control. Also, in her introduction in which she states, “it is difficult to see why there should be an absolute moral difference between creating a spatial barrier to procreation and creating a temporal barrier to procreation.” The moral difference, of course, is in the nature of the act. In one case you are actively stifling the natural end of sexual union, in the other case you are not. If I could give an analogy: the rhythm method is like inviting someone to a wedding who you know is probably unable to come, whereas contraception is sending them an invitation telling them they are unwelcome. 

As is common in ethical debates today, most of the disagreement is actually in the basement. By this I mean, many of the problems with Rosemary Ruether's essay can be traced below the level of ethics to the levels of metaphysics and anthropology. Because she has her theory of causality wrong she posits there can be two ends of marriage which are competitive, and no formal cause. Since she misunderstands the nature of the human being, she misses on her attacks on natural law and gets freedom wrong to a devastating degree. These fundamental philosophical problems bubble up to the surface as ethical errors of consequentialism, a rejection of a notion of human excellence (virtue) and a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between contraception and the rhythm method. With this, I conclude my critique. 

Harms of Remitting Capital Punishment

Harms of Remitting Capital Punishment

Introduction

Categorical remission of capital punishment brings more harm than good for three reasons. First, it puts the question of justice to a backseat behind the consequences of capital punishment. This consequentialist philosophy undercuts the reality of law and morality. Second, it causes confusion in citizens regarding justice, life, morality and punishment. By using language in an imprecise way, we are miseducating society on the true meaning of these terms. Third, it causes a lack of justice. Not punishing people for their crimes is wrong. Not because of the consequences of the lack of punishing, but by the lack of a just penalty.

In this paper, I will explain the natural law basis for capital punishment, and describe these three harms in detail. 

Natural Law Basis for Capital Punishment

“Man is a political animal. He who by nature and not by accident is without a state is either a bad man or above humanity.” Man lives in community with other people. The state, then, follows naturally from the social inclinations of human beings, and the needs that they need to procure for themselves. These communities are ordered towards certain goods, depending on what the men in that society aim at. If there are good men, society can thrive and men can be perfected. If there are vicious men, society will be lawless, and men will be beast-like. The determining factor, then, in the quality of a society is its justice. “Justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.” 

Not only do men gather in societies, but they need to have a leader. Aquinas thinks this is true cosmically, anthropologically, and socially. Just as the body must be governed by the soul, the social animal must be governed by an authority. The leadership of the nation is a cause of the justice of the society. “So fundamental is the duty of public authority to requite good and evil in deeds that natural law philosophers consider it paramount function of the state.” Aquinas puts it this way: “If, therefore, a multitude of free men is ordered by the ruler towards the common good of the multitude, that rulership will be right and just, as is suitable to free men. If, on the other hand, a rulership aims, not at the common good of the multitude, but at the private good of the ruler, it will be an unjust and perverted rulership.”

“Crime disturbs this just order, for the criminal takes from people their lives, peace, liberties, and worldly goods in order to give himself undeserved benefits.” Punishment is due to someone who disturbs the just order. It is owed to the community on account of the wrongs that the person has inflicted on that community. Aquinas even classifies this as a unique virtue: vengeance. He notes that as long as the avengers intentions are just, vengeance is well ordered. These punishments need to come in appropriate degrees. Someone who steals should receive a greater penalty than someone who jaywalks, because they have done more damage to the common good. This punishment must only be carried out by a legitimate authority. 

While it would seem that the capital part of of capital punishment is what most objectors find troublesome, I think a case could be made that it is the punishment part of the phrase. As Ralph McInerny comments on his students who oppose the death penalty, “what I detected, rightly or wrongly, was an animus against punishment as such.” 

With this groundwork laid, let’s consider how categorically rejecting capital punishment causes harm on society. The first harm is that it makes justice in society to be radically utilitarian. In this way it is severed from the nature of human persons and the state. The second harm is that this rejection damages the meaning of our moral language in significant ways. This has effects on education, morality and law. The third harm is that this rejection causes actual injustice in society. 

Utilitarian Justice

The first harm on society from total rejection of capital punishment is that any reason for this rejection stems from secondary elements of the discussion. As stated above, capital punishment is natural to society on account of justice. Crimes deserve punishment, and capital crimes deserve capital punishment. This is the primary reason for the death penalty, it is necessary for a just society. To reject capital punishment as intrinsically evil is to make justice primarily focused on the consequences of punishment, rather than its justice as such. 

Many objections to capital punishment focus on these secondary aspects. Some object that it is playing god to execute souls who are guilty of crimes, because only God can take life. Some object that it causes a bloodthirsty society. Others argue that it doesn’t successfully deter crime. Others argue that we don’t need it anymore because we can keep them in prison for life. Still others hold that it fosters a society that is unforgiving. Lastly, some argue that capital punishment ends a soul’s possibility for rehabilitation. 

While there are counterarguments to these positions, and surely counterarguments to those counterarguments, all of this is secondary to the fact that capital punishment is just. By allowing a society to reject capital punishment as intrinsically evil, that same society implicitly is placing a utilitarian notion of justice over natural notions of justice. Instead of being concerned with doing the just thing, and ordering society justly, we are trying to reap the best consequences we can through our legal system. Ironically, this is the position that is playing god in this debate. By trying to order society based on consequentialist arguments and ignoring justice, we see pride rearing its ugly head. 

This damages society because the law is a teacher. The law tells its citizens something about morality, because the law is meant to make men good. Repealing capital punishment categorically conditions people to think that punishment must have good consequences to be justified. This is not true. If a person who is punished does not rehabilitate, and society is not made better for the payment of punishment, it doesn’t change the fact that justice demands that punishment be paid. It is like working for a day’s wage of $100, and being paid $50, and the boss telling you, “at least you had fun.” That was not the purpose for the day’s labor. The side effects do not change the purpose of the action. In the same way, the consequences of lightening punishment (if they even are beneficial), do not outweigh the objective need for a punishment that fits the crime.  

Terminological Confusion

One of the central thesis of Alisdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue is that our moral vocabulary has been emptied of meaning. When people talk about questions related to moral philosophy today, terms are thrown out that are clearly not agreed upon by both sides. Taking the issue of same sex marriage as an example, its not uncommon to see both sides use the terms love, marriage and sex in different ways, but leave the points unaddressed. Without a common use of language, how are we able to dialogue? The issue of capital punishment has this phenomenon in a sharp way as well. It is interesting that people that are Pro-Life tend to support Capital Punishment, whereas people who are Pro-Abortion are against Capital Punishment. I take the strangeness of this fact to point to the confusion on moral terms today.

With this in mind, I think that one of the harms of a categorical rejection of capital punishment is that there is a further obscuring of the relevant terms of moral philosophy that are pertinent to this debate. I think there are three terms that are especially muddied by this debate: life, punishment, and justice. 

As mentioned above, there seems to be some cognitive dissonance on life issues. How can a person be both Pro-Life and support the death penalty? Does this mean that they don’t truly think that life is valuable? Wouldn’t it be more consistent to protect the life that is more recognizable as living? Questions like these have made the term life to be very unclear in moral discourse. Rather than trying to recognize the term as actually corresponding to reality, it is now weaponized by political factions trying to get particular issues passed. The claim that capital punishment is intrinsically evil has made serious contributions to muddying the meaning of the term life. 

The second term that has been damaged by the move to call the death penalty intrinsically evil is punishment. This is because by having gradually increasing penalties for crimes that are in keeping with those crimes, but then not penalizing certain crimes to the degree they should be punished calls into question the notion of punishment. It makes it seem like punishment is an arbitrary tool of the state, not a work of justice and repair for a community that has been harmed. 

The third term that has suffered damage as a result of this movement is the term justice. As described above, justice is not seen as a utilitarian ideal, not in keeping with a shared human nature. The term justice is thrown out a lot today in regards to economics and rights. Hardly ever do you hear the term justice in regard to duty towards God, Country or family. I think that law and punishment is one of the clearest examples of seeing the meaning of the term justice. We are owed certain things from society, but we also owe society a certain conduct. If we fail to live up to that conduct, then the state needs to hold us responsible and accountable. By nixing the punishment for our worst crimes, we lose out on perhaps the clearest vision of justice that there is. It’s no wonder there is such little meaning to such an important term. 

The loss of meaning of these fundamental terms has effects on morality, education, and law. Without language of the terms that form the backbone of society and moral life, other lesser goals replace them.

One may wonder why it matters if words are harmed, if it saves human lives. As MacIntyre describes these terms if they are stripped of their objective meaning, they become tools for emotivists. To people without a formation in moral philosophy, they are told that there is actually no objective moral law, but only subjective whim. The management of our emotional states as individuals, in conformity with the arbitrary laws that are passed down to us, makes up the totality of the moral life. Since there is no objective morality, education can focus on making us career ready. In this view of education, the purpose is now to make man productive, rather than good. Men should be able to sit still, follow instructions, and operate on a well regimented schedule. Since we are in a democracy, law also will be affected. Since lawmakers come from the populus, and the populus votes for leaders and laws, the moral philosophy of the subjects will be represented by the laws of that country. 

Injustice

The third harm inflicted by categorical rejection of capital punishment is that it is actually unjust. By refusing to punish someone for wrongs they have inflicted on the community is evil. If I steal $100 from my neighbor, I have wronged him. He is owed that $100, and society is owed some form of retribution from me. To pay less than the amount I stole, or to not be given a punishment in keeping with that crime would be evil. The same is true for capital crimes. To not punish individuals who commit these heinous crimes is contrary to justice. 

Conclusion

In this paper, we have covered three different harms inflicted by a total remission of capital punishment. First, that to remit capital punishment on account of secondary elements of the discussion causes society to view justice as utilitarian rather than natural. Second, that it contributes to the bankruptcy of moral vocabulary in our society. Third, that it causes actual injustice in society. By not punishing criminals to the full extent of their crimes is an act of injustice. Having punishments that fit crimes is important for the maintaining of a just society. To ignore this fact is contrary to justice and has devastating consequences on society. 

While discussions within Catholicism have leaned away from Capital Punishment in recent years, its clear that this is not a matter of dogmatic teaching. This has to fit under the purview of prudential judgement. It is clear that capital punishment is just, in the same way that all punishment is just. The position that we need to categorically reject capital punishment as intrinsically immoral, not only causes harm on individuals and society, it is also false.