Comparison Between Nietzsche and Aquinas on Morality

Similarities Between St. Thomas and Nietzsche on Morality

Introduction

 

Friedrich Nietzsche and St. Thomas Aquinas are thinkers who are very different from each other. They could be contrasted from each other in a plethora of ways. However, in this paper, I want to explore what they have in common as it pertains to the study of ethics. I will be drawing from a chapter in Nietzsche’s A Twilight of Idols,[1] which is called Morality as Anti-Nature and from St. Thomas’s Summa Theologiae[2] to do this. And so, the goal of this paper is to compare the thought of Nietzsche to Aquinas as it pertains to Nietzsche’s view of morality.

Comparisons

The first comparison between the two thinkers is that both agree that passions can lead to bad decisions. Nietzsche actually begins this work with this admission. He says, “all passions have a phase when they are merely disastrous, when they drag down their victim with the weight of stupidity.”[3] Later in the work, he returns to this theme by saying that those who wish to reject the passions because of their lack of moderation demonstrate their weakness.[4] The point, for now, is that he is acknowledging that the passions can have negative consequences. St. Thomas Aquinas agrees with this perspective. He holds that the passions themselves are morally neutral, it’s how they interact with reason that determines their goodness and badness.[5]

A second comparison follows from this one. Namely, that since the passions can have negative consequences we are left with 2 options.[6] First, we can cut ourselves off entirely from passions. Nietzsche compares this to castration, in that it looks to destroy a good out of a misplaced sense of self-control. The second option is to spiritualize the passions or use them towards building ourselves to be stronger. Nietzsche thinks that Christianity embodies the first view, because of its desire to cast out temptations which come from passions.[7]

I think that St. Thomas agrees with Nietzsche that the passions need to be spiritualized. One piece of evidence for this is the size of the section of the Summa dealing with the passions. It is one of the largest sections in the entire work. This goes to show that St. Thomas did not think that the passions were evil to be cut down, but rather that they are a vital part of human life. In addition to the volume of this section, the actual text bears this out as well. St. Thomas asks the question: Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?[8] Nietzsche would likely assume that he would answer in the negative. However, St. Thomas says, “it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.” We see that he answers in the affirmative. That the passions are required for executing virtue. Since passions are an important part of the human person, to do the virtuous thing without the passions, is not fully human of fully virtuous. “For Aquinas, the virtuous person is someone who knows the moral thing to do, does it in the right way, and takes delight in doing it.”[9] Notice how delight (a passion) is a core ingredient in moral action.

Additional evidence can be given from the sections on virtue in the Summa. St. Thomas treats of specific virtues and actions which ensure that the passions are in tune with reason, rather than completely unchecked. The most important example is the virtue of temperance.[10] This is the virtue whereby we order our desires of sensuality to reason. At no point does St. Thomas call for them to be cut off or removed, rather they are to be incorporated, or in Nietzsche’s language: spiritualized.

One last piece of evidence from St. Thomas that shows his congruence with Nietzsche on this point is his treatment of fasting. Contrary to Nietzsche’s claim that Christianity is incapable of spiritualizing the passions towards human flourishing, Aquinas treats this as the main purpose of fasting.[11] Nietzsche considered the epitome of Christian virtue to be the person who denies his impulses the most, “the saint in whom God delights is the ideal eunuch.”[12] As Saint Thomas is getting at here, for the Christian these penitential acts of fasting, and chastity are not meant to destroy our ability to feel the passions. Rather, they are meant to bring them into a supernatural light. We see here that rather than being at odds over whether we should spiritualize our passions, St. Thomas seems to agree with Nietzsche on this point, even though their understandings of what that looks like differ.

The third similarity has to do with particular impulses that Nietzsche wants to hold up. These are sensuality and hostility.[13] His claim is that these are noble goods that Christianity wrongfully abhors. He goes on to give the examples of political disputes which make both parties stronger, and war in which he says that “one has renounced the great life when one renounces war.”[14] For Nietzsche, the meaningful life is a life of strength, in which persons allow their impulses to come to fruition.

      Although St. Thomas wouldn’t fully endorse the view that impulses should be allowed to run wild, he does agree that there are merits to these human desires. Of sexuality,[15] he considers the pleasure to be of major importance in the friendship between married persons. Of hostility,[16] he considers passions like anger to be neutral, and actions of vengeance to be virtuous. For, St. Thomas anger is not an evil thing that should be spurned. Rather, it is a natural expression in the face of injustice. We should be angry at injustices. However, it should be cautioned that although these are considered goods for St. Thomas, they need to be moderated by reason. As we have seen, all passions are morally neutral. The question is whether they are exercised in accord with reason or not that gives them merit.

The last comparison involves the correlation between morality and nature. Both thinkers express the view that morality involves living in accord with our nature. Nietzsche says, “every naturalism is morality, that is…dominated by an instinct of life.”[17] Aquinas expresses a similar view,[18] that the goodness and badness of an action, for man, depends on its being conformed to his nature (rational). So, we see that both thinkers agree that morality involves measuring an action against the nature of the thing acting. The point of departure is that Aquinas posits human nature to the distinguishing characteristic of being rational. Nietzsche thinks that human nature involves the impulses or passions that are experienced. He says, “the roots of passion means…the roots of life.”[19]

Conclusion

We have seen that although these two thinkers have vastly different worldviews, they have many similarities in their views of morality, or ethics. They both hold that the passions can lead to poor decisions. They both think that they healthy alternative to cutting yourself off from passions is to incorporate them into a well-functioning life. They also are similar in holding that passions like sensuality and hostility can be meritorious. And finally, both thinkers think that morality is largely connected with living in accord with our nature, although they dispute what that nature is.

 

 

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[1] Nietzsche, Friedrich. Morality as Anti Nature, found at https://www.wolfe.k12.ky.us/userfiles/1009/friedrich%20nietzsche.pdf.

[2] Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae, found at https://www.newadvent.org/summa/

[3] Nietzsche, Friedrich. Morality, Section 1, Paragraph 1.

[4] Nietzsche, Friedrich. Morality, Section 2, Paragraph 3.

[5] Aquinas, Thomas. ST, I-II, 24, 1.

[6] Nietzsche, Friedrich. Morality, Section 1, Paragraphs 1-2.

[7] Nietzsche, Friedrich. Morality, Section 1, Paragraph 2.

[8] Aquinas, Thomas. ST, I-II, 59, 5.

[9] Petri OP, Thomas, Thomism of the Body Lecture, found at https://soundcloud.com/thomisticinstitute/thomism-of-the-body-fr-thomas-petri

[10] Aquinas, Thomas, ST, II-II, 141, 3-4.

[11] Aquinas, Thomas, ST, II-II, 137, 1, ad 2-3.

[12] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morality, Section 4, Paragraph 8.

[13] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morality, Section 3, Paragraph 5.

[14] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morality, Section 3, Paragraph 6.

[15] Aristotle and Aquinas, Thomas. _Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics_, 1723. Trans.

C.J. Litzinger, O.P. Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 1964. Print. 524.

[16] Aquinas, Thomas, ST, II-II, 108, 2.

[17] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morality, Section 4, paragraph 8.

[18] Aquinas, Thomas, ST, I-II, 18, 5.

[19] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Morality, Section 1, Paragraph 2. 

Comparison Between John Locke and St. Thomas Aquinas on Innate Ideas

 The Convergence Between John Locke and St. Thomas Aquinas in Rebutting Innate Ideas

Introduction

In this paper, I will be arguing there is a convergence between John Locke and St. Thomas Aquinas’s perspectives on innate ideas. It should be stated from the start that both thinkers argue against innate ideas, and so I will be defending their criticism. It is my goal to show how their positions converge. I will begin by describing the terms that we need to understand before comparing these perspectives. Next, I will lay out how John Locke and St. Thomas deal with the theory of innate ideas. Then, I will show how St Thomas’s perspective on innate ideas converges with Locke’s. And last, we will conclude by summarizing.

Definitions

The first term that we need to define is idea. Locke defines this term loosely. He says, “It being the term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking.”^[1] As we can see, this is a very open definition. The key point to emphasize is that ideas are the object of the understanding. So, whenever a person thinks, or calls something to mind, the thing that is brought up or thought about, is an idea.

The more difficult part to define is the term innate. This is a term that Saint Thomas doesn’t use directly. Locke does use the term explicitly, and it is the entire point of Book 1 of the work we are analyzing.^[2] However, he doesn’t give an explicit definition for the term, like he does for the term idea. However, he does explain what he means by it. He says, “It is an established opinion among some men that there are in the understanding certain innate principles…primary notions, characters, as it were, stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being and brings into the world with it.”^[3] He goes on to give a couple examples, “Whatever is, is” and “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.”^[4] These are often called the Law of Identity and the Law of Non-Contradiction respectively.

John Locke and St. Thomas Aquinas on Innate Ideas

John Locke has two main problems with the concept of innate ideas. The first is that “universal consent proves nothing innate.”^[5] Locke thinks that even if I grant you that these ideas exist, it doesn’t follow that they come innately. He is perfectly content to say that these ideas are self-evident, even if they are not innate. He says, “Universal and ready assent upon hearing…is (I grant) a mark of self-evidence; but…not [of] innate impressions.”^[6] The second problem is that innate ideas don’t seem to be universally assented to.^[7] He describes how “children and idiots”^[8] don’t have explicit knowledge of these innate ideas. As evidenced by the fact that they cannot articulate these laws. He asks, how can these laws be universal, if there are people who do not know them in any meaningful sense? He thinks it is absurd to hold that someone has knowledge of something that they don’t know about.

St. Thomas also argues against innate ideas. In his disputed questions on truth he articulates the Platonic position that knowledge is latent in the mind and needs to be drawn out of us. [9]  For this to be the case, the ideas that make up knowledge must be innate, or pre-existing in us. This position seems to be broader than the one that Locke is responding too, in that it claims that all ideas are innate. The Platonists that Locke was responding to, like Descartes, held that only these fundamental laws of logic are the innate ideas, and that all other knowledge could be drawn out from them.[10] Despite the difference in scope, Thomas’s response still gives us an insight into what he thought about innate ideas.

St. Thomas responds to this Platonic reasoning by saying that it leads to an absurdity.^[11] His reasoning is as follows. Removing impediments is only to cause accidentally. To teach, based on the Platonic theory that learning is remembering, would mean only to remove impediments. Therefore, Platonic teaching is only an accidental cause, which is absurd. Saint Thomas says that such a position runs afront to what we see in the rest of creation: God allowing secondary causes to cause. He says, “this derogates from the order of the universe, which is made up of the order and connection of causes, since the first cause, by the pre-eminence of its goodness, gives other beings not only their existence, but also their existence as causes.”[12]

How Locke and Aquinas Converge

Now that we have laid out how both thinkers summarize and object to the theory of innate ideas, I will now show three ways that Locke and Aquinas have converged in their disputes with innate ideas. The first convergence between St. Thomas and John Locke on this question is that they both admit of the possibility of innate powers, while maintaining their objections to innate ideas. John Locke cites the eyes ability to see color as an example of a natural power that we possess which gives us the possibility to learn through the senses.[13]

Saint Thomas agrees that there are innate powers which give us the capacity to know. He says “in this way all knowledge is in a certain sense implanted in us from the beginning (since we have the light of the agent intellect) through the medium of universal conceptions which are immediately known by the light of the agent intellect.”[14] This long quotation shows that St. Thomas thinks there is a natural power (the agent intellect) which is innate. He also holds up that in this respect, we can see the value of the Platonic view of innateness of knowledge, so long as you distinguish powers from ideas.

The next two convergences will show how St. Thomas is similar to Locke in that both thinkers have similar conceptions of knowledge. In their responses to the theory of innate ideas, both lay out similar epistemologies. The second convergence, then, is that both thinkers see knowledge as starting in the senses. Both see the senses being the beginning of knowledge. Locke says, “this great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.”[15] St. Thomas agrees, in one place saying, “it is true that our mind receives knowledge from sensible things.”[16] Both thinkers argue that we first have to sense a thing in order to get knowledge off the ground.  

The third convergence is that both thinkers see the mind recreating what was observed through the senses. Although they use different terminology for this process, these thinkers both articulate this phenomenon. Locke calls this process reflection.[17] “External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us.”[18] We see here that the raw material that the reflective part of our mind has to work with, comes from what we have obtained through our senses. St. Thomas calls this power the agent intellect, which takes the sense knowledge and converts these things so that they are “made actually intelligible”[19] Here again, both thinkers are positing a similar phenomenon. 

Conclusion

            We have seen two thinkers who argue against a Platonic notion that ideas are innate. Both thinkers converge in formulating their own theories of knowledge while debating this question. They converge in finding that there are in fact innate powers, that give us the capacity for knowledge. Even though the ideas themselves are not innate, the powers by which we can know ideas are. They also converge in finding that knowledge starts in the senses. And lastly, they converge in finding that knowledge is recreated in the mind to make our sense data intelligible.  

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^[1] Locke, John. Essay Concerning Human Understanding found in Modern Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources, 1, 1, 8, 318. Ed. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2009. Print.  

^[2] Locke, John. Essay, Book 1 Title, 316.

^[3] Locke, John. Essay, 1, 2, 1, 318.

^[4] Locke, John. Essay, 1, 2, 4, 319.

^[5] Locke, John. Essay, 1,2,3, 319.

^[6] Locke, John. Essay, 1, 2, 18. 322.

^[7] Locke, John. Essay, 1,2,4, 319.

^[8] Locke, John. Essay, 1, 2, 5, 319-320.

[9] Aquinas, Thomas. On the Teacher found in Thomas Aquinas Selected Writings, 1, 1, 198. Ed. and trans. Ralph McInerny. London, England: Penguin, 1998. Print.

[10] Interestingly, Locke attempts to push the Cartesian perspective into embracing the ancient perspective. See 1,2,5, 320.

^[11] Aquinas, Thomas. Teacher, 1, 1, 198.

[12] Aquinas, Thomas. The 29 Questions on Truth, 11, 1. Trans. Robert Mulligan SJ, found on https://documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1225-1274,_Thomas_Aquinas,_The_29_questions_on_Truth_(Mulligan_Translation),_EN.pdf , 1952, 347.

[13] Locke, John. Essay, 1, 2, 1, 319.

[14] Aquinas, Thomas. The 29 Questions on Truth, 10, 6. Trans. Robert Mulligan SJ, found on https://documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1225-1274,_Thomas_Aquinas,_The_29_questions_on_Truth_(Mulligan_Translation),_EN.pdf , 1952, page 311.

[15] Locke, John. Essay, 2, 1, 3, 323.

[16] Thomas, Aquinas. 29 Questions, 10, 6, 311.

[17] Locke, John. Essay, 2, 1, 4, 323.

[18] Locke, John. Essay, 2, 1, 5, 323.

[19] Aquinas, Thomas. 29 Questions, 10, 6, 311.

Why St. Thomas doesn't have a Mind-Body Problem

Jordan Phillips

Logic and Epistemology: Final Project

Why Saint Thomas doesn’t have a Mind Body Problem

Introduction

In this presentation, my goal is twofold. First, to articulate the mind-body problem. Second, to explain why this problem does not exist for the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas. To do this, I will begin by defining the mind-body problem. Next, I will explain what the problem is, and what philosophical changes it stems from. Then, I will explain why such a problem is absent for Saint Thomas. When I have concluded, I hope that I have given a fair explanation of the problem and properly described the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas on the matter.

Definition

Dr. Edward Feser in his book Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction gives a definition of the mind-body problem in his glossary. He says, “the mind-body problem is the problem of explaining what the metaphysical relationship is between mental and physical phenomena.”[1] Dr. Margarita Veta gives a similar description, saying that it is the problem of reconciling how the physicality of the body can be reconciled with an immaterial mind. She goes on, though, to give an example of how hearing a joke (a physical process) can result in us finding it humorous (a mental act) and resulting further in contractions of our diaphragm, or laughter (a separate physical process).[2]

Dr. Feser expresses difficulty in defining the mind-body problem. He thinks that simply by defining it, we are likely to smuggle in Descartes metaphysics which separates mind from body. He says, “to characterize it as the problem of explaining how immaterial mental substances can interact with the body seems to presuppose the truth of dualism; while to characterize it as the problem of explaining how mental processes are produced by physical processes in the brain seems to assume the truth of materialism.[3] As we will see, the metaphysical underpinning is the issue here, and so we cannot presuppose one thinkers metaphysics without evidence.

Explanation of Mind-Body Problem

Dr. Vega prescribes this problem as coming to us from Descartes. The cause, as she sees it, is that he thought that not only were the mind and body of more than one nature, but that they are almost opposite entities.[4] Since there are two different natures at work in us, we need to explain what their relationship is. Paul Chutikorn gives a similar explanation of the problem.[5] He agrees that this problem comes down to us from Descartes, and particularly from his view of the human being having two different natures. For Chutikorn though, this stems from Descartes emphasis on the human being as a thinking thing, in conjunction with the dualistic natures at work in man. Because Descartes wants to hold up man as a thinking thing, he is compelled to see “the total essence of the human person was the mind.”[6] Even with this emphasis though, Descartes sees that these two natures are connected, and thinks that we need to explain how. However, as Chutikorn sees it, Descartes never found a way to connect these two natures, and so was left with a dualistic account.

Dr. Feser explains the problem in a different way.[7] He comes at the problem from the perspective of Aristotle’s 4 causes. Aristotle posited that there are four ways a thing could be a cause. You can have a material cause, which causes something by making up the materials it is made of. So, wood would be the material cause of a wooden chair. The second cause is the efficient cause, this is causing in the sense that we tend to think of it: causing something to be a certain way by making or moving it. In the wooden chair example, the person who constructed the chair would be the efficient cause. A third way to be a cause is to explain what the thing is. This is called the formal cause. For the wooden chair, the formal cause would be chair-ness. The fourth and last cause is the final cause. This cause is meant to explain the purpose of a thing. The purpose of the wooden chair would be to sit in.

Dr. Feser agrees with the previous thinkers in that Descartes posits two distinct substances that make up the human person: body and mind. He puts it into the terms of these four causes though.[8] The human being has these 4 causes as well. The material cause of the human being is the matter that he is made of. The formal cause is the soul which animates the body. Descartes wants to scrap these two causes and focus solely on the efficient cause, or how these distinct substances of mind and body interact with each other. Once you’ve determined that these two substances are separate, it’s easy to see why Descartes views them as acting on each other rather than coordinating in sync. In this way, they are efficient causes which continue to act on each other. The question is how.  

Now while Chutikorn thought that Descartes couldn’t answer this question, Feser thinks that he does have an answer, at least in practice. That answer being the famous phrase “a ghost in a machine.”[9] If the mind has the predominant place, and the mind and body are constantly vying for priority, its feasible that this is the result for Descartes. Feser ties us back to these four causes of Aristotle. But first, he gives an example of a spirit haunting a body. When we picture this we see that the body is subject to the spirit. The body basically becomes a haunted zombie. In a similar way, Descartes dualism leaves us with this perspective. Feser concludes, “That is the only kind of interaction that the soul and body would be capable of if the only way they can relate is by efficient causation rather than formal causation.”[10]

St. Thomas’s Perspective

As I hinted at above, this problem is the result of Descartes metaphysics, with which Saint Thomas Aquinas would take exception. Dr. Feser argues from the phenomenon of our experience.[11] He thinks that our experience scoffs at the notion that there are two separate substances at work in us. He gives a couple examples. When we move, it doesn’t feel as if our mind is dragging our body like a puppet but move that they are acting in sync. Similar with our perception, we don’t feel as if we are reading information off the top of our brain, but that we are experiencing reality. He also hints at a thought experiment. If we were to think about what existence would be like if our body and soul were united, we would imagine something very similar to what our experience is. He summarizes the problem with Descartes view by saying, “The interaction problem, you might say, is not the problem of explaining how soul and body interact, but rather the problem of putting yourself in a position (as Descartes does) of having to think of the relation between them as a kind of interaction in the first place.” So for Feser, this isn’t an actual problem, but one invented by bad metaphysics.

Chutikorn gives a similar synopsis of why Saint Thomas would take exception to Descartes metaphysics.[12] He makes clear that Saint Thomas sees the human person as being a united single substance, made up of two principles. These two principles being soul and body. Soul comprising intellect and will (which would be analogous to Descartes mind). The body would be analogous to Descartes view of the body. Chutikorn even wants to make the point that Thomas doesn’t totally disagree with Descartes, in that he believes the intellect and body are distinct from each other. However, this distinction doesn’t go so far as to count them as two different substances like Descartes. So again, Thomas’s metaphysics don’t allow for the interaction of the mind and body to be a problem, because they are united.

Dr. Vega gets at the problem in a way similar to Dr. Feser.[13] She says that Descartes views matter as a separate substance that exists on its own. In contrast to Aristotle and Aquinas who view matter as existing in potency and needing a substance to bring it into actuality. This substance that brings things into actuality is the formal cause. So, in her reading of St. Thomas, the mind body problem doesn’t exist because the potency of matter works in coordination with actuality of its formal cause. She says, “there is a mutual reciprocity between what is in potential and what grants actuality.”

Father Thomas Petri describes Thomas’s view of the unity of the body and soul as a single substance and its comparison to Descartes as well.[14] He mentions in passing that this is hard to articulate today because the language we would use to articulate it has been hijacked by Descartes philosophy. This is a similar point to Feser’s that was made in the definition section of this presentation. He describes the human person succinctly by saying, “For Saint Thomas the soul and the body are not things on their own. They are principles that comprise you. That’s why he says the human person is a composite of body and soul.” We see here with Father Petri what we have seen with all of our thinkers, that this problem of the interaction of the mind and body only exists for someone who posits that they are separate substances. This is something that St. Thomas finds inexplicable.

Conclusion

My objective for this presentation was to define and explain the mind body problem and to show why this problem doesn’t exist for St. Thomas Aquinas. We have seen that if you posit that the human person is comprised of two separate substances you fall into a problem of not knowing how these two substances interact with each other. These two substances are, first, the immaterial mind which coordinates the action of the second, the material body. For St. Thomas though, this is an incorrect view of the human person. We should not posit that the mind and body are separate substances but two principles of the same substance (the person). If we see these two parts as united, we have no problem in seeing how they interact.

  

Works Cited

Chutikorn, Paul.  “A Thomistic Critique Of Cartesian Dualism” Web. https://thomistica.net/essays/2018/11/9/a-thomistic-critique-of-cartesian-dualism 16 July 2020. Uses the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas to rebut the dualism put forward by Descartes. Pertinent because of comparison between two thinkers.

Feser, Edward. “Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Web. https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/09/mind-body-interaction-whats-problem.html 16 July 2020. Brief summary of why Thomists don’t have a mind body problem, and comparison to the problem as seen by Cartesian’s. Pertinent because it addresses the very question to be answered by the presentation.

Feser, Edward. “Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction.” (London, Oneworld Publications, 2005). 192, 15-38. A definition of the mind-body problem, along with ways to answer the supposed problem. It is pertinent to my research because it gives a clean definition and arguments against it.

Petri OP, Fr. Thomas. “69. Thomism of the Body.” (Aquinas 101 Podcast, 2020). 44:50-49:55. 20 July 2020. Describes the Thomistic underpinnings of John Paul II’s Theology of the Body. One such underpinning is Thomistic hylomorphism which he compares against Descartes. Pertinent because of this comparison and because of articulation of Thomas’s position.  

Vega, Margarita. “The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind-Body Problem.” DSPT - Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aLLmtw1sQPw Web. 16 July 2020. Lays out the need for a different answer of the mind-body problem and argues for Aristotle and Thomas’s perspective on the matter. Emphasizes the difference between the two groups thoughts on matters. Pertinent because speaker clearly differentiates perspectives on mind body problem.

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[1] Feser, Edward. Philosophy of Mind. 192.

[2] Vega, Margarita. The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind Body Problem. 0:36-1:02

[3] Feser, Edward. Philosophy of Mind. 192

[4] Vega, Margarita. The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind Body Problem. 0:06-0:36

[5] Chutikorn, Paul. A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism.

[6] Chutikorn, Paul. A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism. Paragraph 1.

[7] Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem?

[8] Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 2.

[9] Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 6.

[10] Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 6.

[11] Feser, Edward. Mind Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 7.

[12] Chutikorn, Paul. A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism. Paragraph 5.

[13] Vega, Margarita. The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind-Body Problem.” 4:20-6:55.

[14] Petri OP, Fr. Thomas. Thomism of the Body. 44:50-49:55.