Why St. Thomas doesn't have a Mind-Body Problem

Jordan Phillips

Logic and Epistemology: Final Project

Why Saint Thomas doesn’t have a Mind Body Problem

Introduction

In this presentation, my goal is twofold. First, to articulate the mind-body problem. Second, to explain why this problem does not exist for the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas. To do this, I will begin by defining the mind-body problem. Next, I will explain what the problem is, and what philosophical changes it stems from. Then, I will explain why such a problem is absent for Saint Thomas. When I have concluded, I hope that I have given a fair explanation of the problem and properly described the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas on the matter.

Definition

Dr. Edward Feser in his book Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction gives a definition of the mind-body problem in his glossary. He says, “the mind-body problem is the problem of explaining what the metaphysical relationship is between mental and physical phenomena.”[1] Dr. Margarita Veta gives a similar description, saying that it is the problem of reconciling how the physicality of the body can be reconciled with an immaterial mind. She goes on, though, to give an example of how hearing a joke (a physical process) can result in us finding it humorous (a mental act) and resulting further in contractions of our diaphragm, or laughter (a separate physical process).[2]

Dr. Feser expresses difficulty in defining the mind-body problem. He thinks that simply by defining it, we are likely to smuggle in Descartes metaphysics which separates mind from body. He says, “to characterize it as the problem of explaining how immaterial mental substances can interact with the body seems to presuppose the truth of dualism; while to characterize it as the problem of explaining how mental processes are produced by physical processes in the brain seems to assume the truth of materialism.[3] As we will see, the metaphysical underpinning is the issue here, and so we cannot presuppose one thinkers metaphysics without evidence.

Explanation of Mind-Body Problem

Dr. Vega prescribes this problem as coming to us from Descartes. The cause, as she sees it, is that he thought that not only were the mind and body of more than one nature, but that they are almost opposite entities.[4] Since there are two different natures at work in us, we need to explain what their relationship is. Paul Chutikorn gives a similar explanation of the problem.[5] He agrees that this problem comes down to us from Descartes, and particularly from his view of the human being having two different natures. For Chutikorn though, this stems from Descartes emphasis on the human being as a thinking thing, in conjunction with the dualistic natures at work in man. Because Descartes wants to hold up man as a thinking thing, he is compelled to see “the total essence of the human person was the mind.”[6] Even with this emphasis though, Descartes sees that these two natures are connected, and thinks that we need to explain how. However, as Chutikorn sees it, Descartes never found a way to connect these two natures, and so was left with a dualistic account.

Dr. Feser explains the problem in a different way.[7] He comes at the problem from the perspective of Aristotle’s 4 causes. Aristotle posited that there are four ways a thing could be a cause. You can have a material cause, which causes something by making up the materials it is made of. So, wood would be the material cause of a wooden chair. The second cause is the efficient cause, this is causing in the sense that we tend to think of it: causing something to be a certain way by making or moving it. In the wooden chair example, the person who constructed the chair would be the efficient cause. A third way to be a cause is to explain what the thing is. This is called the formal cause. For the wooden chair, the formal cause would be chair-ness. The fourth and last cause is the final cause. This cause is meant to explain the purpose of a thing. The purpose of the wooden chair would be to sit in.

Dr. Feser agrees with the previous thinkers in that Descartes posits two distinct substances that make up the human person: body and mind. He puts it into the terms of these four causes though.[8] The human being has these 4 causes as well. The material cause of the human being is the matter that he is made of. The formal cause is the soul which animates the body. Descartes wants to scrap these two causes and focus solely on the efficient cause, or how these distinct substances of mind and body interact with each other. Once you’ve determined that these two substances are separate, it’s easy to see why Descartes views them as acting on each other rather than coordinating in sync. In this way, they are efficient causes which continue to act on each other. The question is how.  

Now while Chutikorn thought that Descartes couldn’t answer this question, Feser thinks that he does have an answer, at least in practice. That answer being the famous phrase “a ghost in a machine.”[9] If the mind has the predominant place, and the mind and body are constantly vying for priority, its feasible that this is the result for Descartes. Feser ties us back to these four causes of Aristotle. But first, he gives an example of a spirit haunting a body. When we picture this we see that the body is subject to the spirit. The body basically becomes a haunted zombie. In a similar way, Descartes dualism leaves us with this perspective. Feser concludes, “That is the only kind of interaction that the soul and body would be capable of if the only way they can relate is by efficient causation rather than formal causation.”[10]

St. Thomas’s Perspective

As I hinted at above, this problem is the result of Descartes metaphysics, with which Saint Thomas Aquinas would take exception. Dr. Feser argues from the phenomenon of our experience.[11] He thinks that our experience scoffs at the notion that there are two separate substances at work in us. He gives a couple examples. When we move, it doesn’t feel as if our mind is dragging our body like a puppet but move that they are acting in sync. Similar with our perception, we don’t feel as if we are reading information off the top of our brain, but that we are experiencing reality. He also hints at a thought experiment. If we were to think about what existence would be like if our body and soul were united, we would imagine something very similar to what our experience is. He summarizes the problem with Descartes view by saying, “The interaction problem, you might say, is not the problem of explaining how soul and body interact, but rather the problem of putting yourself in a position (as Descartes does) of having to think of the relation between them as a kind of interaction in the first place.” So for Feser, this isn’t an actual problem, but one invented by bad metaphysics.

Chutikorn gives a similar synopsis of why Saint Thomas would take exception to Descartes metaphysics.[12] He makes clear that Saint Thomas sees the human person as being a united single substance, made up of two principles. These two principles being soul and body. Soul comprising intellect and will (which would be analogous to Descartes mind). The body would be analogous to Descartes view of the body. Chutikorn even wants to make the point that Thomas doesn’t totally disagree with Descartes, in that he believes the intellect and body are distinct from each other. However, this distinction doesn’t go so far as to count them as two different substances like Descartes. So again, Thomas’s metaphysics don’t allow for the interaction of the mind and body to be a problem, because they are united.

Dr. Vega gets at the problem in a way similar to Dr. Feser.[13] She says that Descartes views matter as a separate substance that exists on its own. In contrast to Aristotle and Aquinas who view matter as existing in potency and needing a substance to bring it into actuality. This substance that brings things into actuality is the formal cause. So, in her reading of St. Thomas, the mind body problem doesn’t exist because the potency of matter works in coordination with actuality of its formal cause. She says, “there is a mutual reciprocity between what is in potential and what grants actuality.”

Father Thomas Petri describes Thomas’s view of the unity of the body and soul as a single substance and its comparison to Descartes as well.[14] He mentions in passing that this is hard to articulate today because the language we would use to articulate it has been hijacked by Descartes philosophy. This is a similar point to Feser’s that was made in the definition section of this presentation. He describes the human person succinctly by saying, “For Saint Thomas the soul and the body are not things on their own. They are principles that comprise you. That’s why he says the human person is a composite of body and soul.” We see here with Father Petri what we have seen with all of our thinkers, that this problem of the interaction of the mind and body only exists for someone who posits that they are separate substances. This is something that St. Thomas finds inexplicable.

Conclusion

My objective for this presentation was to define and explain the mind body problem and to show why this problem doesn’t exist for St. Thomas Aquinas. We have seen that if you posit that the human person is comprised of two separate substances you fall into a problem of not knowing how these two substances interact with each other. These two substances are, first, the immaterial mind which coordinates the action of the second, the material body. For St. Thomas though, this is an incorrect view of the human person. We should not posit that the mind and body are separate substances but two principles of the same substance (the person). If we see these two parts as united, we have no problem in seeing how they interact.

  

Works Cited

Chutikorn, Paul.  “A Thomistic Critique Of Cartesian Dualism” Web. https://thomistica.net/essays/2018/11/9/a-thomistic-critique-of-cartesian-dualism 16 July 2020. Uses the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas to rebut the dualism put forward by Descartes. Pertinent because of comparison between two thinkers.

Feser, Edward. “Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Web. https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/09/mind-body-interaction-whats-problem.html 16 July 2020. Brief summary of why Thomists don’t have a mind body problem, and comparison to the problem as seen by Cartesian’s. Pertinent because it addresses the very question to be answered by the presentation.

Feser, Edward. “Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction.” (London, Oneworld Publications, 2005). 192, 15-38. A definition of the mind-body problem, along with ways to answer the supposed problem. It is pertinent to my research because it gives a clean definition and arguments against it.

Petri OP, Fr. Thomas. “69. Thomism of the Body.” (Aquinas 101 Podcast, 2020). 44:50-49:55. 20 July 2020. Describes the Thomistic underpinnings of John Paul II’s Theology of the Body. One such underpinning is Thomistic hylomorphism which he compares against Descartes. Pertinent because of this comparison and because of articulation of Thomas’s position.  

Vega, Margarita. “The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind-Body Problem.” DSPT - Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aLLmtw1sQPw Web. 16 July 2020. Lays out the need for a different answer of the mind-body problem and argues for Aristotle and Thomas’s perspective on the matter. Emphasizes the difference between the two groups thoughts on matters. Pertinent because speaker clearly differentiates perspectives on mind body problem.

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[1] Feser, Edward. Philosophy of Mind. 192.

[2] Vega, Margarita. The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind Body Problem. 0:36-1:02

[3] Feser, Edward. Philosophy of Mind. 192

[4] Vega, Margarita. The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind Body Problem. 0:06-0:36

[5] Chutikorn, Paul. A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism.

[6] Chutikorn, Paul. A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism. Paragraph 1.

[7] Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem?

[8] Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 2.

[9] Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 6.

[10] Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 6.

[11] Feser, Edward. Mind Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 7.

[12] Chutikorn, Paul. A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism. Paragraph 5.

[13] Vega, Margarita. The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind-Body Problem.” 4:20-6:55.

[14] Petri OP, Fr. Thomas. Thomism of the Body. 44:50-49:55.

Comparing Aristotle and Aquinas on Friendship

Comparing Aristotle and Aquinas on Friendship

Final Essay: Exposition

Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 605

By: Jordan Phillips

Introduction

In this paper, I will explain the concept of friendship as it is developed in Books 8 and 9 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I will also compare it to Thomas’s application of these texts into Christian thought.[1] I will quote from the Summa Theologica, the Summa Contra Gentiles, the Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and the Commentary on the Gospel of John.[2],[3],[4],[5] I will briefly give the context for both thinkers works. I think this is important for putting their thought in perspective. Next, I will show how they define friendship, and why they think it is important. Then, I will discuss the different levels of friendship, and how the objectives of the individuals involved mark each type. Lastly, I will look at the characteristics of friendship. In this section, I will show how Saint Thomas advances from Aristotle’s thought in two areas: Divine Friendship and Marriage. I will also show how Saint Thomas builds off Aristotle’s principles of friendship to describe Christian charity.

Context of Authors Works

The goal of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is to find how to make men happy. He says that he is looking for the goal for which all of our actions are conducted (particularly those actions that are done for their own sake).[6] The answer to this is happiness: “both the common people and the educated say [the highest good of human action] is happiness.”[7] Now, since what makes man special for Aristotle is his ability to reason, our happiness is going to have to do with reasoning well.[8] Another way to put this, is that man should be virtuous in order to be happy.[9] He goes on to describe virtue and to differentiate virtues. It is in this context that we see his discussion of friendship. He even says that friendship is a kind of virtue, because it requires frequent actions of goodwill, which become habits and eventually virtues.[10]

Friendship is a subject of moral philosophy or finding the happy life for 3 reasons.[11] First, everybody needs friends. Rich and poor, young and old, rulers and subjects, fortunate and unfortunate all need to have friends. When we are struggling, we need help, when we are doing well, friends can give us guidance for improvement, or fraternal correction to keep us on the straight and narrow. Secondly, friendships are built into nature because people have things in common. We come into the world with familial and societal relationships, and these only increase as we make decisions throughout our lives. These people that we are bound with are almost natural friends. Aristotle even makes the point that we have things in common with everybody. This is what all friendships can build from. Thirdly, friendship is necessary for civic society. When citizens get along well, society can do well; when citizens are in a state of unrest, society will be in unrest.

Saint Thomas Aquinas’s writings were meant mostly for academic audiences. They have different goals. His commentaries were essentially transcriptions of his classroom lectures.[12] His Summa Contra Gentiles was meant to train missionaries in evangelizing other religions, as is implied by the name of the work. His Summa Theologica was meant for Dominican Novices in training of Theology.[13] His application of Aristotle’s work of friendship is especially pertinent in his views of the Christian virtue of Charity, but is also brought out to discuss the sacrament of Marriage, and to describe salvation as will be seen towards the end of this essay.

Definitions

Now that we have put the author’s works in context, we will look at their definitions of friendship, and explore why they think it is important. Aristotle’s definition of friendship has 3 parts, all which follow from his argumentation throughout the chapter. Friendship involves “men wishing good to one another, that this fact is recognized by each, and that it be for the sake of one of the reasons previously mentioned.”[14] We will investigate all three parts of this definition.

The first of these aspects is that friendship involves men wishing good to one another. Thomas comments on this, “the good of a friend must be willed for his sake and not for the sake of the one loving.”[15] We can see immediately in Thomas’s interpretation of this, that he is applying it to charity. In his first article on Charity in the Summa, he brings out several parts of this very passage from Aristotle. As a matter of fact, he directly cites this section of the Ethics. He draws out at least three elements: Aristotle’s comparison to benevolence, his comparison to our affinity towards inanimate things, and the central idea of the definition: wishing good to another.[16] We can see from this that Thomas agrees with Aristotle’s notion of friendship as requiring goodwill towards the other.

The second element of the definition, that this goodwill be recognized by each, requires further explanation. Aristotle wants to make a distinction between beneficence and friendship. Both involve this good wishing towards the other. Beneficence, however, doesn’t require that the other knows about the good wishing. Friendship does require this. He says, “they cannot be called friends when unaware of one another’s feelings.”[17] For example, if I say a prayer for a person who is struggling, but they aren’t aware of my doing so, this is beneficence but not friendship. They have no way to take solidarity in my wishing well for them. That’s not to say that this action isn’t virtuous, it is. For Aristotle, it’s a separate virtue, but it isn’t friendship.

There is evidence that Aquinas doesn’t agree with this. First, he places beneficence in the virtue of charity in his Summa Theologica.[18] Secondly, in article 1, he draws off Aristotle’s notion of friendship to define beneficence.[19] This seems to point to Thomas wanting to include beneficence as part of friendship, and that the mutual knowledge of both parties is not essential to the definition.

However, if we move on in the same question to article three, he says that “we ought to be most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.”[20] He goes on to list kinsmen, citizens, and those who follow the same religion as examples. Although Thomas doesn’t explicitly say this, I think one of the reasons he thinks beneficence applies to those who are closest to us, is at least partially because of the mutual knowledge of this goodwill. Especially in light of his statement in article 1, “neither does well wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite…this is founded on some kind of communication.”[21] So, I think Thomas can be interpreted as seeing this portion of Aristotle’s definition as essential to friendship as well.

The third aspect of Aristotle’s definition was “that it be for the sake of the reasons previously mentioned.” In his commentary on this definition, Saint Thomas interprets this to mean: “the good, the pleasurable or the useful.”[22] As we will see in the following section, these are the three types of friendship that are based on the objects we pursue in our relationships. This requires further explanation, as it is a key to understanding much of Aristotle’s thought on friendship.

Three Types of Friendship

Since there are three different kinds of things we look for in our friendships, Aristotle posits that there must be three kinds of friendship.[23] The three things we look for in relationships are utility (usefulness), pleasure and goodness (virtue). Friendships of utility are those where “one does not love the other for the other’s sake but only for the good they mutually gain.”[24] In the same passage, he describes friendship of pleasure as “those who love for the sake of pleasantness love for the pleasure they enjoy.” In contrast, friendship of virtue, or perfect friendship, are those “who wish good to friends for their sake…they do this for the friends themselves and not for something incidental.”[25] Let’s look at each of these types in greater detail.

I like to use an example for friendship of utility. This type of friendship is like my relationship with a waiter at a restaurant. If I am nice to this person, they are more likely to be more careful and do a better job serving me. If I am a jerk to this person, I am less likely to get refills when I want them. So, it is in my best interest to be nice to this person. We can see here that ultimately, I am acting in my own best interest, and not the interest of the waiter. This is what we see in friendships of utility. Both parties are seeking some good to be received from the relationship.

These relationships are not very deep and are easily dissolvable. If this waiter messes up my order or doesn’t refill my drinks as often as I like, I may tip them less, causing further strain on the relationship. This example shows what Aristotle means by saying, “If the reason for the friendship no longer exists, the friendship itself is dissolved.”[26]

The same is true of the next level of friendship, friendship of pleasure.[27] These are easily dissolvable for a similar reason. In this type of friendship, both parties are seeking pleasure from the relationship. Aristotle uses the example of young people. Young people, Aristotle thinks, “foster friendship mostly for pleasure.” Because of this, their friendships dissolve as frequently as their pleasures change: “they fall in and out of love the same day.” As a High School teacher, I see this all the time. Students who are in and out of different relationships and friend groups as their interests change. For example, during the fall, football players tend to spend a lot of time with fellow football players. When this sport ends, and they start basketball season, their friend group changes to fit their new interest.

It is easy at this point to look down on these types of friendship. After all, they are self-seeking. However, we need these friendships, and they exist in nature for a reason. We are creatures of need, so it’s not intrinsically wrong to build friendships out of need. We also need a certain amount of pleasure. Aquinas thinks that just as the body needs rest from physical labor, so does the soul need rest. “This relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words and deeds. It becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times.”[28] These friendships are good, even if they aren’t the fulness of friendship.

Let’s turn to what both thinkers consider the best friendship. Aristotle says, “perfect friendship is friendship between men who are good and resemble one another according to virtue.”[29] The difference between the kinds of friendship, as we have said, lies in the objective of the friendship. If we are looking for something, this is a friendship of utility. If we are looking for pleasure, it is a friendship of pleasure. The objective for perfect friendship is the others good. It isn’t about what the individual is getting out of it. “People who wish good to friends for their sake are the truest friends; they do this for the friends themselves and not for something incidental.”[30] Where the other two friendships were fickle, this one is strong. “Friendships between such men remain as long as they are virtuous; and virtue is a permanent habit.”[31]

There are a couple more attributes to this type of friendship that Aristotle wants us to be aware of.[32]  First, he argues that this type of friendship is most intense, because it is ordered towards a good life, which is our highest good. Secondly, he wants us to be aware that these friendships are very rare, because virtuous men are rare. Another reason for the rarity of these types of friendships, is that they require a lot of time. We all know that to develop trust, a lot of time together is required. Aristotle cites a proverb that makes his point: “people do not know one another until they eat [a peck of[33]] salt together.”[34] A peck being a substantial amount, implying a substantial amount of meals eaten together.

As we will see in the next section, Aquinas is mostly interested in this type of friendship. He doesn’t think that the first two even qualify as friendships. He says, “friendships of this sort [utility and pleasure] plainly are not friendships essentially but incidentally, because a person is not loved for what he is but for utility or pleasure.”[35] In his Summa Theologica[36] he says, “If we do not wish good to what we love but wish it for ourselves, it is love not of friendship, but a kind of concupiscence.” He adds that we love all sorts of inanimate things in this way, like “wine” and “horses,” but we would think it absurd to refer to these things as friends. In the same way, then, we should not consider friendships of pleasure or utility friends in the true sense.

Characteristics of Friendship

The last section of this essay will look at a couple of the characteristics of friendship from the perspective of Aristotle. In looking at the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas we will view the areas where he takes Aristotle’s perspective and relates it into Christian philosophy. The first Aristotelian characteristic of friendship is the notion of equality. As we will see, for Aristotle, friendship requires being able to give and receive in some kind of proportion. Given his view of the world, this eliminates the possibility of friendship with God. Saint Thomas has a robust understanding of how we can be friends of God and of the person of Jesus. This view of equality of proportion also has implications for the sacrament of marriage. The other characteristic of Aristotle’s thought that we will look at is how the friend is another self. Aquinas expands on this teaching in his view of Christian charity.

As stated, we will start with the idea of equality as a prerequisite to friendship. Aristotle starts by saying that this should be seen outside of the purview of the three kinds of friendship because they have different “motives for loving.”[37] They can, however, be classed together because they all involve unequal positions of the lovers. He gives the example of Fathers and Mothers, Sons and Fathers, and Rulers and Subjects. These examples, he posits, cannot give each other an equal return. A son can never give his father due love for bringing him into being. However, he does think that when children are just to their parents, a long lasting and deep friendship can be had.[38] Given that this is an example made for the whole class, we can take this principle to apply to the whole class. Namely, that although perfect proportion cannot be had in these relationships, if the individuals act justly, a friendship of virtue can be attained.

This is an important takeaway regarding marriage. You will hear many commentators on this subject say that Aristotle and Aquinas differ in that the former thought that virtuous friendship between the spouses was impossible because of the inequality of the sexes, and that Thomas corrected this teaching.[39] When we look at what Aristotle is saying, this isn’t quite right. He does include the possibility of virtuous friendship. It isn’t surprising that he doesn’t make this point clearer than he does elsewhere, because virtuous friendship is rare in all cases.[40]

Aristotle does think that the marriage relationship has clear motives for friendship of utility and pleasure. For utility, he teaches that people “are more included by nature to conjugal [friendship] than political society.”[41] The family is prior to the state for Aristotle. The reason for marriage though, is that everybody in the family has material needs, including children. And by nature, men and women are equipped to fulfill these roles according to their sexes.[42] There is clearly an element of utility in marriage. Aristotle also thinks that there is an element of pleasure. Aquinas cites the “generative act” as a source of pleasure within marriage.[43] We could add deep conversation and recreation as other sources of pleasure.

However, Aristotle doesn’t stop here. Just as we said above, friendships of virtue are possible in unequal relationships, so long as there is a just giving of oneself to the other. This friendship “can exist for the sake of virtue if the husband and wife are virtuous, for each has his proper virtue and they can delight in it.”[44] Now while Thomas doesn’t correct Aristotle’s teaching in this regard as many commentators claim he does, I think that he does strengthen his argument.

Thomas says, “the greater the friendship is, the more solid and long-lasting will it be. Now, there seems to be the greatest friendship between husband and wife, for they are united not only in the act of fleshly union…but also in the partnership of the whole range of domestic activity.”[45] Thomas here has taken two key principles of Aristotle’s to strengthen Aristotle’s own position. First, that the long-lasting friendships, are likely friendships of virtue. Marriage is a long-lasting friendship. Therefore, marriage is a friendship of virtue. Secondly, Aristotle thinks that a common life is the basis of friendship.[46] The more areas of life that are shared, the more likely this is a friendship of virtue. Saint Thomas is saying here, husband and wife share their whole life together domestically. And so, Aquinas uses Aristotle’s principles to strengthen his own position, not to supersede it.

There is an area where Saint Thomas clearly does go beyond Aristotle in this regard though. Again, for friendships of people that are on unequal footing, Aristotle thinks that friendships are complicated. If there is too great a distance between the two subjects, friendship seems impossible to Aristotle. This is true of Kings and those in “humbler walks of life.”[47] However, it is most true in the case of men with God.[48]

Saint Thomas, having revelation, can go beyond this. Thomas thinks that because of the incarnation, we are able to be brought into friendship with God.[49] This friendship is not something that we merit on our own, but is a gift of grace.[50] And this love of God needs to be extended to our neighbor, that they too may become friends of God.[51]

Thomas also thinks that this friendship can be extended to friendship with the person of Christ. One way is with Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. He takes Aristotle’s principle that friends need to live a life in common,[52] to show that it is necessary for Christ to be present in the Eucharist for us to have friendship with him.[53] In the same way that friends who eat much salt together, can build a deep friendship; those who partake of the sacred meal of Christ’s body and blood, can enter into deep friendship with Jesus. The Eucharist gives us the very life of Jesus, and so in an ultimate way, we live a life in common with him. Thomas thinks another way that we can have friendship with Christ if we follow Christ’s commands with filial fear (as opposed to servile fear).[54]

This is the major separation of Aquinas from Aristotle on this issue of friendship. Aquinas thinking that friendship with God is possible, is something that goes beyond what Aristotle could envision through philosophy. This is not surprising though. Since, it is only because God has revealed himself to us, and became man, that this friendship is possible. It isn’t that Thomas thinks that we earn friendship with God. It is solely because of God’s action through Grace and the incarnation that this friendship is possible.

Another place where Saint Thomas goes beyond the thought of Aristotle, because of his access to revelation, is the virtue of Charity. Aristotle doesn’t have a virtue of Charity. He does lay a foundation for Thomas to understand Charity in a deeper way though. Aristotle thinks that by living “according to reason”[55] as opposed to passion, man loves himself rightly. Aquinas agrees with this, and says unfortunately though, “Most men are such that they follow sense rather than reason.”[56] However, in either case people do what they perceive to be in their best interests. It’s just that some act virtuously, in accord with reason; others act viciously or incontinently because they follow their passions.

But, because Thomas believes that we are called to “love your neighbor as yourself,”[57] he thinks we can be friends of God by loving our neighbor. He interprets this passage: “by the fact that you love yourself, you love yourself in which you will good to yourself….so also you should choose the good of righteousness for your neighbor.[58] Just like how we naturally do what we can to help ourselves, we should do this for our neighbor. This is charity, and this unites us to God. Just as in with the natural virtues, we can improve on this virtue of charity by doing acts of charity, which develop into habits, and the virtue itself. The difference is that this virtue is infused in us by God,[59] where the others can come about through repetition. Saint Thomas has taken Aristotle’s principle of rightly ordered self-love, and shown how in the light of the Gospel, it can give us an image of what it means to live charitably.

Conclusion

            Aristotle shows a hierarchy of friendship that progresses from usefulness to pleasure to virtue. His robust teaching on the characteristics of friendship fit into his teaching about living a happy life. Saint Thomas builds on this teaching because of his access to revelation. He makes stronger Aristotle’s perspective on marriage. He describes the possibility of friendship with God through Charity. Thomas has taken Aristotle’s hierarchy and added a level of friendship with God which we should all strive to obtain for ourselves, by cooperating with his Grace.

 

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[1] Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics in Introductory Readings in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy. Ed. C.D.C. Reeve Patrick Lee Miller, Trans. Reeve. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2015. Print.

[2] Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica, Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981. Print.

[3] Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Trans. Vernon J. Bourke. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. Print. 

[4] Aristotle and Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Trans. C.J. Litzinger, O.P. Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 1964. Print.

[5] Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on the Gospel of John. Ed. The Aquinas Institute, Trans. Fr. Fabian R. Larcher, OP. Lander, Wy: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Scripture, 2013.

[6] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 1, Lecture 2, 1-2. Trans. Litzinger. 7.

[7] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 1, Lecture 4, 1-2, see also Book 1, Lecture 9. Trans. Litzinger. 35.

[8] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 1, Lecture 10, 6. Trans. Litzinger. 40.

[9] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 1, Lecture 14, 3-4, 9-10. Trans. Litzinger. 55.

[10] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 5, 1. Trans. Litzinger. 491.

[11] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 1, 2-4. Trans. Litzinger. 475.

[12] 105. How should we understand morality? With Fr. Dominic Legge. Narr. Matt Fradd. Pints with Aquinas. 8 May 2018. Web. 4 July 2020.

[13] ST. Prologue. Trans. Fathers. xix.

[14] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 2, 9. Trans. Litzinger. 479.

[15] Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1558. Trans. Litzinger. 480-481. Emphasis mine.

[16] ST II-II, 23, a 1. Trans. Fathers.

[17] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 2, 8, see also Book 9, chapter 7. Trans. Litzinger. 479.

[18] ST II-II, 31. Trans. Fathers.

[19] ST II-II, 31, a 1. Trans. Fathers.

[20] ST II-II, 31, a 3. Trans. Fathers.

[21] ST II-II, 31, a 1. Trans. Fathers.

[22] Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1561. Trans. Litzinger. 481.

[23] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 1. Trans. Litzinger. 482.

[24] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 2. Trans. Litzinger. 482.

[25] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 10-13. Trans. Litzinger. 482.

[26] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 3. Trans. Litzinger. 482.

[27] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 7-9. Trans. Litzinger. 482.

[28] ST II-II, 168, a 2. Trans. Fathers.

[29] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 10. Trans. Litzinger. 482.

[30] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 12. Trans. Litzinger. 482.

[31] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 13. Trans. Litzinger. 482.

[32] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 16-17. Trans. Litzinger. 483.

[33] Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1582. Trans. Litzinger. 487.

[34] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 18. Trans. Litzinger. 483.

[35] Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1566. Trans. Litzinger. 484.

[36] ST II-II, 23, a. 1. Trans. Fathers.

[37] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 7, 2,4. Trans. Litzinger. 499.

[38] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 7, 5. Trans. Litzinger. 499.

[39] 63: Aristotle’s 3 Types of Friendship, with Emily Barry. Narr. Matt Fradd. Pints with Aquinas. 3 July 2017. Web. 4 July 2020.

[40] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 6, 2-4. Trans. Litzinger. 494.

[41] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 12, 18. Trans. Litzinger. 520.

[42] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 12, 19. Trans. Litzinger. 520.

[43] Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1723. Trans. Litzinger. 524.

[44] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 12, 20. Trans. Litzinger. 520.

[45] SCG 3:II, 123, 6. Trans. Bourke. 148

[46] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 5, 5. Trans. Litzinger. 491.

[47] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 7, 9. Trans. Litzinger. 499.

[48] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 7, 10. Trans. Litzinger. 499.

[49] ST II-II. 23. 1. Trans. Fathers.

[50] ST II-II. 24. 2. Trans. Fathers.

[51] ST II-II. 25. 1. Trans. Fathers.

[52] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 9, Lecture 14, 6. Trans. Litzinger. 586.

[53] ST III. 75. 1. Trans. Fathers.

[54] Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on the Gospel of John Chapters 9-21. 2011, 2015. Trans. Larcher. 291, 292-293.

[55] Aristotle. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 9, Lecture 9, 8. Trans. Litzinger. 566.

[56] Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1864. Trans. Litzinger. 565.

[57] Matthew 22:39. RSV.

[58] Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew Chapters 13-28. 1819. Trans. Larcher. 253-254.

[59] ST II-II. 24. 2. Trans. Fathers.