Football, Misdirection and Lying

Football, Misdirection and Lying

The Catholic Intellectual Tradition has a long and complicated history in regard to what constitutes lying. Thinkers like Saint Thomas Aquinas and Saint Augustine hold the position that it's never morally justifiable to tell a lie. The speech act is meant to communicate truth. Intentionally communicating things that are ordered towards deception is disordered. Lying, or deceptive communication, is always wrong, then. Just like with any wrongdoing, there are different levels to how grave the wrongdoing is. 

There is debate within this tradition as to how much information needs to be given. When someone walks past me in a store and says, “how are you today?,” a long response detailing the state of my gallbladder is probably not in keeping with that conversation. Similarly, jokes are not considered to be lies, even though they involve momentary deception. So, there is an acceptance that different types of conversations warrant different types of responses. 

Clearly, we communicate more than just with words. If I stand up and walk briskly at you with an angry expression while rolling up my sleeves, your assumption will probably be that I’m going to confront you. 

Thinking about lying through the lens of action leads to some other significant questions. For example, in military battles, there are often attempts at deception. Deception is useful for protecting soldiers through camouflage, aiding in ambush, or in surprising an enemy. False Flag Operations in Naval Battles are a good example. Navy’s used to acquire enemy flags and raise them on their own ships, in an attempt to trick enemies into thinking they are passing a friendly ship. Once the enemy ship gets within range, the ship can attack. All of these can be defended as examples of lying, even though speech isn't involved.

From the traditional perspective it would seem to be immoral to engage in this kind of military deception.

As an assistant football coach, I’ve been thinking about another implication of this discussion. It is common for football teams to utilize misdirection. Oftentimes teams will call plays with the aim of tricking the defense. Football fans will be familiar with things like fake punts, surprise onside kicks, and flea flickers. All of these use pretty drastic means of deceiving opponents about what kind of play is coming. 

Even beneath these drastic types of plays, there are even more simple plays that seem aimed at deception. Counter plays for example look to show a run in one direction to get defensive players to over pursue in one direction, and then to run the actual play in the opposite direction. Similarly, play action passes are aimed at making defensive players think a run is coming, or at least freezing them to think about it, so that you can create space for receivers to get open for a passing play. 

Thinking about these means of misdirection seems to be immoral from a traditional perspective. These plays intentionally deceive defenses into thinking one thing is coming, so that offenses can take advantage of it. Similar to military deception, this seems to involve lying. 

However, I stated above that even this traditional perspective on lying holds that particular kinds of discourse allow for more flexibility here. Joking, for example, allows for momentary deception for the goods of laughter and friendship. I also gave the example of simple greetings. When we ask how someone is doing, we are surprised to hear a thoughtful and deep answer to that. We all know someone that overshares things about themselves, that don't seem in keeping with the kind of conversation being had. If this principle holds for speech, it should hold for other kinds of communication too. The example I gave earlier of approaching someone angrily looks different depending on the situation. If you just threw a baseball at the back of their head, that’s a different kind of situation than if you attached him to a long email chain he doesn’t want to be a part of. In the former case, you can expect a confrontation, in the latter case, you might suspect he’s pretending to be angry for a laugh. 

So, a principle that seems to be at play here is that we can identify the parameters around different types of communication and respond accordingly. In football, it is clear to everyone involved that it is a game. Two teams are competing to score more points than their opponent. It follows from this that offenses can use misdirection to try to help them move the football. And so, it seems that misdirection is justified, and even enhances the competition. In the same way that jokes and appropriate dialogue enhance relationships, misdirection ups the stakes of football and makes the competition all the better. 

What Principle Determines Whether a Thing is Alive?

Introduction

Modern Biology textbooks often begin with some variation of this question. The answer includes some assortment of the following characteristics: Made of Cells, Organized (or specialized), Grows and Develops, Reproduces, performs Homeostasis, and performs Metabolism. These lists vary. Some include a couple more attributes, some cut a few, and some group some together. My thesis in this essay is that there is a better principle to determine whether a thing is alive: namely, Aristotle’s notion of living things as self movers. Obviously, this expression will need explanation. I will be drawing on the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas to do this. I will argue that the modern conception actually fits nicely into the more explanatory and more succinct principle offered by Aristotle and Aquinas.  

I will proceed in the following way. First, I will explain St. Thomas’s notion of living things as self-movers. Second, I will critique the modern description of life as an amalgamation of features. Third, I will show how the modern view can be incorporated into the Aristotelian model. 

Living Things as Self-Movers

St. Thomas Aquinas tackles this question in I. 18. 1 of the Summa. He begins by outlining this principle of self-movement. The difference between a living animal and a dead one, is that a living one can move itself, while a dead one needs to be moved by another. Next, he describes how movement needs to be taken generally. Movement, for Aquinas, is closer to the word change. He is not limited only to locomotion when he describes movement. Rather, there are several senses of this term. An ice cube that melts into a puddle of water undergoes a kind of motion, or change. Similarly, a student who masters the spanish language has moved from a potential knowledge of spanish to an actual understanding. Movement, then, can mean any kind of change for St. Thomas. Non-living things can move. Rivers can flow, rocks can roll and planets can orbit. The key difference is in what is causing the movement. Non-living things are always moved by something outside it. Living things are agents, and so act on their own. Living things move in and through themselves. 

So, a living thing is simply that which can exercise change on or through itself. A squirrel scouring the ground for nuts is executing complicated actions ordered towards specific goals. Similarly, a sunflower moves itself in accord with the sun throughout the day to obtain maximum amounts of sunlight. Trees and Shrubs grow in a way that allows them to obtain sunlight. Even simpler than this though, the squirrel works to regulate an internal environment that is comfortable for the squirrel. Just as a sound engineer modifies all the dials and modules in a studio to optimize sound, the squirrel tinkers with all sorts of internal hormones and materials to be able to function well. The same can be said for plants who change the amounts of chemicals they take in so that water can be best preserved. Are these not types of self movement? The organism is executing and acting on the world to preserve itself. This, I think, is what differentiates the living from the non-living for St. Thomas Aquinas. 

Critique of Modern Biological Description of Living Things

As I stated in the introduction, modern biology considers things to be living that check the boxes in a relatively standard checklist. This checklist includes being made of cells, conducting homeostasis, metabolizing energy, growing and developing, responding to stimuli and reproduction. There are small variations in this list, but this is a pretty standard one. I think there are a couple significant problems with looking at the question of living things in this way. 

First, lists are not definitions. If you asked me what a human being was, and I proceeded to list off human beings, I failed to understand the question. Even if I listed off attributes that humans typically have, this is still not a helpful definition. To say that a human being is something that has arms, larynxes, and medicine cabinets does not answer the question. 

Second, definitions need to give a principle that sets the limits between types of things. Taking the human being example, we need to describe what makes them in common with other things, then appeal to what differentiates them. Animality is what it has in common, rationality is what separates them from the animals. A human being, then, is a rational animal. This definition gives the principle by which you can include and exclude it against other things. Even a helpful list of attributes (hairy, bipedal, joke-telling, etc), doesn’t accomplish this. 

The definition of life needs to be able to give the principle that separates the living from non-living, while also telling you something about all living things. I think that Aquinas’s definition is actually quite good here. Living things are substances (things that contain a unity), that are capable of self-movement. Rocks are substances, but they don’t have the ability to move according to their own powers. Squirrels are substances who also have the capability for acting on the world around them. So long as we adequately explain what we mean by the term self-mover, this definition seems to be in good shape. 

Reconciliation of Modern and Ancient Perspectives

While the modern perspective misses the mark from being useful as a definition, I think it can be reconciled into the Thomistic perspective. I think that most of the things included in the checklist are actually examples of being a self-mover. Let’s take each one individually. 

Reproduces. In Biology, reproduction involves a passing down of genetic material between generations. This looks different depending on the type of organism we are talking about. Regardless though, this is an act that the organism carries out. And so, is an act of self-movement. 

Responds to Stimulus. This characteristic means that living things react to changes in their environment. Living things are able to act differently depending on their external surroundings. Again, this presupposes an ability to act and change on its own. 

Metabolizes Energy. Living things convert between food and energy. Plants take in energy and convert it to food (while using some of it). Animals take in food and convert it into energy. All living things though have this relationship between food and energy. Again, this is an example of self-movement. Being able to convert chemicals is something that requires agency in some capacity. 

Uses Homeostasis. This refers to living things regulating their internal conditions. When we get cold, we shiver. When we get thirsty, we seek water. Lizards seek shade to avoid overheating. Some viruses will hunker down into a seed form if they sense the presence of certain immunological responses. This is another great example of self-movement, or agency. 

Grows and Develops. This characteristic is actually two distinct features. Growth refers to change in size. This occurs in part due to mitosis. By increasing the number of cells an organism has, it grows in size. Development refers to the different stages of life an organism goes through. Humans go from fetus to toddler to teenager, etc. Both of these also require the organism to be orchestrating and enacting these changes on its own. Rivers grow because of external factors, but foxes grow because of internal movement. 

Made of Cells. This doesn’t factor into this definition much, but is a can of worms that I intend to write about soon. Modern biology considers living things to be nothing but the cells that make them up. Aristotle and Aquinas would recognize that this ignoring of formal causation is actually a root to this problem. Living things have a formal cause that makes them alive. This formal cause is the soul. Corpses still have a material constitution of cells, but they lack the unifying principle of a soul to make them into the unified organism it used to be. I think this is a large reason why modern science can’t see what the principle that determines life is. By ignoring formal causation, science loses its ability to see underlying principles. In this case, agency or self-movement. 

Conclusion

I think the modern list of characteristics of living things fails as a definition. It does not point to a principle that separates living things from nonliving things. It seems to me that Saint Thomas Aquinas’s account of living things as self-movers does allow us to classify things according to a real principle. Nonliving things can only be acted upon. They are passive recipients of what occurs in nature. Living things, though, are actors upon the world. Living things do things. While the characteristics are nice examples of this, this is ultimately secondary to having a principle in place. By returning to this principle, science has a firmer leg to stand on in building up a true study of living things.

Critique of Rosemary Ruether's Defense of Contraception

Critique of Rosemary Ruether's “Birth Control and the Ideals of Marital Sexuality”

Summary of Ruether Essay

I will begin my critique by summarizing the text as strongly as I can. Ruether begins by explaining how many of the terms of this debate are muddy. She cites how terms like relational value and formal cause of procreation are read in different ways by both sides of the debate. She goes on to describe the purposes of marriage. She thinks there are two: procreation and unity of the spouses. Next, she describes the ideals of both of these ends of marriage. These are successful procreation during the sexual act for the first end, and total free and loving exchange between the spouses during every sexual act for the second end. Next, she describes reasons why these ideals are unreachable in the world. After this, she goes on to describe the different means of avoiding pregnancy and how they each fit with the two ends of marriage. She begins this section by removing total abstinence (when not intending to have children) from the table. She argues that not only is this largely impossible, it's bad for both ends of marriage. Unitive is rather obvious: the couple is refraining from sexual union. But also the procreative end, because procreation and education go hand in hand. When the unitive bond between spouses is broken, the nurturing aspect of education is also broken. 

It's clear then that some form of contraception is necessary. It is unhealthy for spouses to refuse sexual communion for long periods of time. The four options are sterilization, temporal contraception, technological contraception, and medicinal contraception. Sterilization is off the table because it is permanent. It removes the freedom to choose life in the future. Temporal contraception, like the rhythm method, is impersonal, anxiety inducing and ineffective. Technological contraception has the drawback of being “aesthetically distasteful.” However some technological means allow for the act to reach completion, so these seem better. Also it's not clear to Ruether how this distastefulness is unnatural. Rather, it seems more like an aid (like reading spectacles). 

She concludes the essay by describing further flaws in the rhythm method. I view this section as largely seeking to respond to the arguments from the pulpit. She views the argument that the rhythm method as an ascetic discipline is problematic and misplaced coming from clergy. She also describes how the refusal of contraception makes Catholics sex obsessed. And lastly, she concludes with a clever image: to refuse to smile when you are happy is simply not healthy. 

I think that this is a thoughtful and well written defense of the use of oral and technological contraceptives. Her description of the rhythm method as a temporal contraception is clever. I also think her consideration that the ideals of marriage are very difficult to achieve should be taken seriously. Despite her thoughtfulness, I ultimately disagree with her fundamental points. I will now critique Ruether’s Essay.  

Critique of Ruether Essay

I think there are several serious problems in this essay. First, I think Ruether is wrong to assume that marriage has two ends. Second, Ruether uses a conception of freedom that is misguided. Third, the view that because the ideals are arduous, so we should lighten them, is not a good argument. Fourth, her subtle critiques of natural law miss the mark. Fifth, she holds a consequentialist view that evil may be done if it bears good fruits. Sixth, she holds that the rhythm method is a form of contraception. I will expound on each of these points. 

The first and fundamental mistake that Ruether makes is assuming that marriage has two ends. This is a common trope today even from within the Catholic Church. I think Aquinas has a better explanation of the nature of marriage. St. Thomas argues that “the form of matrimony consists in a certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered. And the end of matrimony is the begetting and upbringing of children: the first of which is attained by conjugal intercourse: the second by the other duties of husband and wife, by which they help one another in rearing their offspring.” We see here that the union of spouses is not a goal of the marriage, it is the form, essence or nature of the marriage. It’s what a marriage is! The goal is to beget and educate offspring from this union. 

Notice that Aquinas does hold that the union of spouses is attained by intercourse. However, since this is the form of the marriage and not an end, it doesn’t need to be continually sought for a marriage to thrive. Rather, the couple should be aiming at begetting and raising offspring to the worship of God. Instead of viewing a marriage as something seeking unity, we should view it as a unity seeking children and their proper rearing. While defending this view would require exploring and defending Aristotle’s four causes, at the very least this alternative is just as viable as the one she assumes. At the most, it casts serious doubt on her heavy leaning on the unitive aspect of marriage over and above the procreative aspect. 

A second problem in Ruether’s essay is her use of the term freedom. I think page 78 is a clear example of this. Ruther describes how using contraception is the only way that a married person can be free, since they are having children only when they concretely choose to. This view of freedom follows what Servais Pinckaers calls “freedom of indifference.” In essence, it's the view of freedom as not tied to human happiness, but rather as freedom from external influences. In this view I am free to play the piano when I don’t have conditions which prevent me from playing the piano. This is Ruethers vision of freedom. Nature and economic situations are all impediments to me choosing what I want. My will imposes itself on reality. In the context of marriage, then, my partner and I should have total control over when children come about from our sexual union, without the inhibitions of morality, economics, or human nature. 

This contrasts with “freedom for excellence.” In this freedom, in real freedom, we are tied to human nature and to what will make us happy. Being constrained by the circumstances of human existence is not an enemy of freedom, rather it is the condition for it. Only because we were made a certain kind of thing with particular ends can we become more and more excellent. Returning to the piano example, I am free to play the piano only if I have trained and perfected my abilities as a pianist. In the same way, I am free to have and raise a child excellently when I submit to the realities of human nature and have grown and perfected my own human abilities. Rather than trying to control my situation, I submit to the Providence of the God who governs all things down to the existence of every moment, and have children according to the excellences I have achieved through growth in virtues. By exercising virtues, spouses work together to have children as they see appropriate and through appropriate means. This is living a marriage excellently. This is a free marriage. 

A third problem with Ruethers essay is her view that because we are not able to reach the ideals of marriage, we need to lighten the means to reach these ideals is mistaken. In no other situation does this line of reasoning work. Imagine a person who reasons: it is difficult to reach the ideal of telling the truth, so I must be able to lie in situations where it's really difficult to tell the truth. We would judge that person’s reasoning to be mistaken. Ruether is correct that it is difficult for married couples to balance having children in a virtuous way and being intimate to a satisfactory degree. It doesn’t follow from this that we can use illegitimate means to balance these things though. Rather, we should seek to grow in virtue so as to balance these things appropriately. It is interesting that she describes a comfortable amount of children at her time (1964) as between two and five children. As contraception has become more and more accepted in society, this number has shrunk dramatically. Most families have less than 2 children. In addition, marriages have suffered, divorce has become widely prevalent and pornography is used by a large percentage of people. Perhaps her argument can be flipped on its head. Even under the ideal circumstances of a contraceptive heavy culture, humans are too selfish to use the tool appropriately, and so we shouldn’t bother. 

Ruether has another problem, though. While she doesn’t address natural law theory directly, she makes a couple subtle jabs at it. I’m thinking of two places in particular. First, in her defense of traditional contraceptives, she compares them to an aid like reading glasses. Second, in her conclusion, she describes how unhealthy it would be to refuse to smile when one is happy. This is an analogy pointing to the absurdity of squelching natural desires for intimacy because of ethical norms. Towards the first point, I think Ruether just flat misses the mark. Contraception is not an aid towards the ends of marriage (presupposing that there are two). The purpose of contraception is to prevent conception, which is the primary end of the marital act. It would be akin to saying that ear plugs are aids in hearing. Towards the second point, I will respond in the following way. Human beings are rational animals. Smiling, or feelings of happiness, are parts of our animal nature. Since the rational nature is higher, it governs the lower parts of our nature. There are circumstances where it isn’t appropriate to smile. If someone tells you a funny joke during a funeral, it is appropriate to hold that smile back. Reason should govern over the passions. In the same way, if prudence demands abstaining from sexual intercourse for a valid reason, it should govern the passion of sexual intimacy which comes from our animal nature. To be clear, I am not saying that our animal instincts and natures are bad, just that they need to be governed by our higher rational nature. 

The fifth problem that I find with Ruether’s essay is that she is expressing a consequentialist view of the matter. She leaves the question of whether contraception is licit off the table. Rather, she is seeking to see which route will have the best consequences. This is not how one should proceed in ethics. The primary judgment in an ethical question is: is this action right or wrong? It is not for us to decide what consequences are best. We may never do evil that good may come. We aren’t that good at judging the future anyways. Rather, we should start with asking whether an action is in keeping with human nature or not, and then proceeding to the more circumstantial elements. Contraception is wrong because it cuts against the purpose of sexual union. It is a violation of human nature. Even using consequentialist reasoning though, we have seen multiple decades now of widespread contraceptive use. The results have been disastrous. People don’t want to get married, marriages don’t last, marriages don’t produce as many children, use of pornography is rampant, and females are seen as objects for gratification widely in first world cultures. These are not good consequences. 

A 6th problem in this essay is that Rosemary Ruether holds that the Rhythm Method is a form of contraception. This can be seen in her list of types of birth control. Also, in her introduction in which she states, “it is difficult to see why there should be an absolute moral difference between creating a spatial barrier to procreation and creating a temporal barrier to procreation.” The moral difference, of course, is in the nature of the act. In one case you are actively stifling the natural end of sexual union, in the other case you are not. If I could give an analogy: the rhythm method is like inviting someone to a wedding who you know is probably unable to come, whereas contraception is sending them an invitation telling them they are unwelcome. 

As is common in ethical debates today, most of the disagreement is actually in the basement. By this I mean, many of the problems with Rosemary Ruether's essay can be traced below the level of ethics to the levels of metaphysics and anthropology. Because she has her theory of causality wrong she posits there can be two ends of marriage which are competitive, and no formal cause. Since she misunderstands the nature of the human being, she misses on her attacks on natural law and gets freedom wrong to a devastating degree. These fundamental philosophical problems bubble up to the surface as ethical errors of consequentialism, a rejection of a notion of human excellence (virtue) and a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between contraception and the rhythm method. With this, I conclude my critique. 

Harms of Remitting Capital Punishment

Harms of Remitting Capital Punishment

Introduction

Categorical remission of capital punishment brings more harm than good for three reasons. First, it puts the question of justice to a backseat behind the consequences of capital punishment. This consequentialist philosophy undercuts the reality of law and morality. Second, it causes confusion in citizens regarding justice, life, morality and punishment. By using language in an imprecise way, we are miseducating society on the true meaning of these terms. Third, it causes a lack of justice. Not punishing people for their crimes is wrong. Not because of the consequences of the lack of punishing, but by the lack of a just penalty.

In this paper, I will explain the natural law basis for capital punishment, and describe these three harms in detail. 

Natural Law Basis for Capital Punishment

“Man is a political animal. He who by nature and not by accident is without a state is either a bad man or above humanity.” Man lives in community with other people. The state, then, follows naturally from the social inclinations of human beings, and the needs that they need to procure for themselves. These communities are ordered towards certain goods, depending on what the men in that society aim at. If there are good men, society can thrive and men can be perfected. If there are vicious men, society will be lawless, and men will be beast-like. The determining factor, then, in the quality of a society is its justice. “Justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.” 

Not only do men gather in societies, but they need to have a leader. Aquinas thinks this is true cosmically, anthropologically, and socially. Just as the body must be governed by the soul, the social animal must be governed by an authority. The leadership of the nation is a cause of the justice of the society. “So fundamental is the duty of public authority to requite good and evil in deeds that natural law philosophers consider it paramount function of the state.” Aquinas puts it this way: “If, therefore, a multitude of free men is ordered by the ruler towards the common good of the multitude, that rulership will be right and just, as is suitable to free men. If, on the other hand, a rulership aims, not at the common good of the multitude, but at the private good of the ruler, it will be an unjust and perverted rulership.”

“Crime disturbs this just order, for the criminal takes from people their lives, peace, liberties, and worldly goods in order to give himself undeserved benefits.” Punishment is due to someone who disturbs the just order. It is owed to the community on account of the wrongs that the person has inflicted on that community. Aquinas even classifies this as a unique virtue: vengeance. He notes that as long as the avengers intentions are just, vengeance is well ordered. These punishments need to come in appropriate degrees. Someone who steals should receive a greater penalty than someone who jaywalks, because they have done more damage to the common good. This punishment must only be carried out by a legitimate authority. 

While it would seem that the capital part of of capital punishment is what most objectors find troublesome, I think a case could be made that it is the punishment part of the phrase. As Ralph McInerny comments on his students who oppose the death penalty, “what I detected, rightly or wrongly, was an animus against punishment as such.” 

With this groundwork laid, let’s consider how categorically rejecting capital punishment causes harm on society. The first harm is that it makes justice in society to be radically utilitarian. In this way it is severed from the nature of human persons and the state. The second harm is that this rejection damages the meaning of our moral language in significant ways. This has effects on education, morality and law. The third harm is that this rejection causes actual injustice in society. 

Utilitarian Justice

The first harm on society from total rejection of capital punishment is that any reason for this rejection stems from secondary elements of the discussion. As stated above, capital punishment is natural to society on account of justice. Crimes deserve punishment, and capital crimes deserve capital punishment. This is the primary reason for the death penalty, it is necessary for a just society. To reject capital punishment as intrinsically evil is to make justice primarily focused on the consequences of punishment, rather than its justice as such. 

Many objections to capital punishment focus on these secondary aspects. Some object that it is playing god to execute souls who are guilty of crimes, because only God can take life. Some object that it causes a bloodthirsty society. Others argue that it doesn’t successfully deter crime. Others argue that we don’t need it anymore because we can keep them in prison for life. Still others hold that it fosters a society that is unforgiving. Lastly, some argue that capital punishment ends a soul’s possibility for rehabilitation. 

While there are counterarguments to these positions, and surely counterarguments to those counterarguments, all of this is secondary to the fact that capital punishment is just. By allowing a society to reject capital punishment as intrinsically evil, that same society implicitly is placing a utilitarian notion of justice over natural notions of justice. Instead of being concerned with doing the just thing, and ordering society justly, we are trying to reap the best consequences we can through our legal system. Ironically, this is the position that is playing god in this debate. By trying to order society based on consequentialist arguments and ignoring justice, we see pride rearing its ugly head. 

This damages society because the law is a teacher. The law tells its citizens something about morality, because the law is meant to make men good. Repealing capital punishment categorically conditions people to think that punishment must have good consequences to be justified. This is not true. If a person who is punished does not rehabilitate, and society is not made better for the payment of punishment, it doesn’t change the fact that justice demands that punishment be paid. It is like working for a day’s wage of $100, and being paid $50, and the boss telling you, “at least you had fun.” That was not the purpose for the day’s labor. The side effects do not change the purpose of the action. In the same way, the consequences of lightening punishment (if they even are beneficial), do not outweigh the objective need for a punishment that fits the crime.  

Terminological Confusion

One of the central thesis of Alisdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue is that our moral vocabulary has been emptied of meaning. When people talk about questions related to moral philosophy today, terms are thrown out that are clearly not agreed upon by both sides. Taking the issue of same sex marriage as an example, its not uncommon to see both sides use the terms love, marriage and sex in different ways, but leave the points unaddressed. Without a common use of language, how are we able to dialogue? The issue of capital punishment has this phenomenon in a sharp way as well. It is interesting that people that are Pro-Life tend to support Capital Punishment, whereas people who are Pro-Abortion are against Capital Punishment. I take the strangeness of this fact to point to the confusion on moral terms today.

With this in mind, I think that one of the harms of a categorical rejection of capital punishment is that there is a further obscuring of the relevant terms of moral philosophy that are pertinent to this debate. I think there are three terms that are especially muddied by this debate: life, punishment, and justice. 

As mentioned above, there seems to be some cognitive dissonance on life issues. How can a person be both Pro-Life and support the death penalty? Does this mean that they don’t truly think that life is valuable? Wouldn’t it be more consistent to protect the life that is more recognizable as living? Questions like these have made the term life to be very unclear in moral discourse. Rather than trying to recognize the term as actually corresponding to reality, it is now weaponized by political factions trying to get particular issues passed. The claim that capital punishment is intrinsically evil has made serious contributions to muddying the meaning of the term life. 

The second term that has been damaged by the move to call the death penalty intrinsically evil is punishment. This is because by having gradually increasing penalties for crimes that are in keeping with those crimes, but then not penalizing certain crimes to the degree they should be punished calls into question the notion of punishment. It makes it seem like punishment is an arbitrary tool of the state, not a work of justice and repair for a community that has been harmed. 

The third term that has suffered damage as a result of this movement is the term justice. As described above, justice is not seen as a utilitarian ideal, not in keeping with a shared human nature. The term justice is thrown out a lot today in regards to economics and rights. Hardly ever do you hear the term justice in regard to duty towards God, Country or family. I think that law and punishment is one of the clearest examples of seeing the meaning of the term justice. We are owed certain things from society, but we also owe society a certain conduct. If we fail to live up to that conduct, then the state needs to hold us responsible and accountable. By nixing the punishment for our worst crimes, we lose out on perhaps the clearest vision of justice that there is. It’s no wonder there is such little meaning to such an important term. 

The loss of meaning of these fundamental terms has effects on morality, education, and law. Without language of the terms that form the backbone of society and moral life, other lesser goals replace them.

One may wonder why it matters if words are harmed, if it saves human lives. As MacIntyre describes these terms if they are stripped of their objective meaning, they become tools for emotivists. To people without a formation in moral philosophy, they are told that there is actually no objective moral law, but only subjective whim. The management of our emotional states as individuals, in conformity with the arbitrary laws that are passed down to us, makes up the totality of the moral life. Since there is no objective morality, education can focus on making us career ready. In this view of education, the purpose is now to make man productive, rather than good. Men should be able to sit still, follow instructions, and operate on a well regimented schedule. Since we are in a democracy, law also will be affected. Since lawmakers come from the populus, and the populus votes for leaders and laws, the moral philosophy of the subjects will be represented by the laws of that country. 

Injustice

The third harm inflicted by categorical rejection of capital punishment is that it is actually unjust. By refusing to punish someone for wrongs they have inflicted on the community is evil. If I steal $100 from my neighbor, I have wronged him. He is owed that $100, and society is owed some form of retribution from me. To pay less than the amount I stole, or to not be given a punishment in keeping with that crime would be evil. The same is true for capital crimes. To not punish individuals who commit these heinous crimes is contrary to justice. 

Conclusion

In this paper, we have covered three different harms inflicted by a total remission of capital punishment. First, that to remit capital punishment on account of secondary elements of the discussion causes society to view justice as utilitarian rather than natural. Second, that it contributes to the bankruptcy of moral vocabulary in our society. Third, that it causes actual injustice in society. By not punishing criminals to the full extent of their crimes is an act of injustice. Having punishments that fit crimes is important for the maintaining of a just society. To ignore this fact is contrary to justice and has devastating consequences on society. 

While discussions within Catholicism have leaned away from Capital Punishment in recent years, its clear that this is not a matter of dogmatic teaching. This has to fit under the purview of prudential judgement. It is clear that capital punishment is just, in the same way that all punishment is just. The position that we need to categorically reject capital punishment as intrinsically immoral, not only causes harm on individuals and society, it is also false. 

Aristotle and Modern Science on Aging of Animals

Aristotle and Modern Conceptions of the Aging Process of Animals

By: Jordan Phillips

Philosophy of Science

Introduction

There are many perennial questions in philosophy of science. One of them is how do we account for aging and for differences in life spans between species. Why, for example, can turtles live for over a century, while mice only live for a handful of years. This fits best into the subcategory of philosophy of biology. Aristotle reflected on this question in a brief work titled “On Length and Shortness of Life.” His work has stark differences to conceptions from modern biology. I will use four sources to demonstrate these contemporary perspectives. The first is a video commentary. The second is a standard pathology textbook. The third is the standard college biology textbook. And finally, a video from an anatomy trainer. In this paper, I will do two things. First, I will summarize both Aristotle and modern scientific thought on aging. Second, I will compare and contrast these visions. 

Aristotle on Aging

Aristotle begins answering this question in a surprisingly modern way. While Aristotle doesn’t have as deep of an understanding of the material world as we do, he begins analyzing this question by looking at the material causes of natural objects. He wants to point out that matter acts in two relevant ways here. Some types of matter seem to cycle between generation and decay, while other types of matter pass away in modes unique to themselves. To the former category, he says, “Hence it is natural to infer that everything else arising from them and decomposed of them should share in the same nature, in all cases where things are not, like a house, a composite unity formed by the synthesis of many things.” This is a stunningly modern statement. He is saying that to understand the decaying of a living thing over its lifetime, we have to look primarily at the material causes of that decay. Towards the latter category, he gives the example of the health of a body is only a logical question in regard to a body that is alive. In this way, the matter of health is reliant on the matter of the body as a whole. 

Next, Aristotle goes on to describe matter’s relationship to change. He says, “all things are at all times in a state of transition and are coming into being or passing away.” So, a material substance like a plant or an animal is limited to a finite amount of time by its very nature. Aristotle argues that this is because matter is immediately followed by contrariety. Inherent in matter is rivalry, competition and change. 

Now that Aristotle has laid out the principles of the material world, he is ready to apply it to living things. He uses examples from his vast study of living things to discount false perspectives on this issue. For example, he excludes the possibility that larger organisms always outlive smaller animals, since horses have shorter lives than humans. He does this to compare size, sanguinity, and terrestrial vs aquatic species to show that none of these, in themselves, is the principle of what makes an organism live longer than another. While this is the case, he thinks there are general patterns of lifespan given these traits. He thinks in general, your largest plants have the longest life span, sanguineous animals live longer than ones with open circulatory systems, and that land animals live longer than sea animals. Also, he thinks that larger animals generally live longer than smaller animals. 

From these observations, he starts to look for a cause. He thinks that in general young and healthy organisms are “humid and warm,” while old age makes animals “dry and cold, and so is a corpse.” (466a18-20). From this observation, he infers that there must be a fluid in animals that is less and less available throughout an organism's life, and that this fluid is given in amounts depending on the type of organism that it is. This, he thinks, explains why large plants and animals (in general) live longer. They are larger, and so can store more of this fluid. 

He goes on to argue that this fluid diminishes as organisms use fluid throughout their lifetime. He thinks that species that reproduce at high rates tend to live shorter lives because the loss of the fluids involved in reproduction contributes to drying up of this fluid. Furthermore, men tend to sweat more than women, and so this contributes to their shorter lifespans than women (466b12-14). He concludes this section by saying that climate and environment affect lifespan as well.

This view clearly lacks some of the scientific information that has been discovered over the last 2000 years. Most especially the cell theory which tells us that living things are made up of cells. One textbook tells us, “[cells] are as fundamental to the living systems of biology as the atom is to chemistry.” So, put in Aristotle’s own language, he is missing a lot of detail about the material cause of living things, that he simply was not in a position to know about. I personally find it interesting that he emphasizes the liquid nature of this fundamental substance, since cells are mostly a liquid substance.

Contemporary Biology on Aging

Contemporary biology views aging as the result of “cell death and dysfunction.” Throughout an organism's life they replace their cells thousands of times through cell division, or mitosis. As children, we do this for growth. As adults, we do this for health and maintenance. As we get older, this process becomes less and less efficient. This causes two problems. First, we replace our cells slower and slower. Second, cells begin to lose their ability to function at a high level. 

How does this account for the range of lifespans though? After all, all things are made of cells, so why are some able to live longer than others? Joao Pedro de Magalhães thinks there are two factors: environment and size. Environment seems to dictate lifespan because it correlates with metabolic rate. Organisms that live in frigid climates seem to have longer lifespans because their bodily processes (cell division, respiration, circulation, etc.) operate much more slowly than temperate animals. Animals in more temperate climates have quicker metabolisms, which lower their lifespans. 

Size is also a factor here because it usually determines the ecological role that that organism will have. For example, large animals tend to have less predators. Since this is the case, their life cycle can take longer. These species will tend to reproduce multiple times in a life cycle, raise offspring for longer, and live longer lives. Smaller organisms, on the other hand, tend to be prey. This causes them to need to develop and reproduce quickly in life, leading to a shorter life cycle. 

There are exceptions to these factors. Some temperate climate animals live longer than frigid climate animals. Some smaller animals live longer than large animals. Magalhaes argues that this is due to behavioral adaptations though. Bats, for example, are a small organism, but live longer because they have behaviors like flocking that help their survival and reproduction. 

While this is the mainstream narrative for how aging occurs, there are two strands of new research that are pertinent here. First,in studying the process of DNA replications, scientists have found that the strands of DNA get a little bit shorter every time they are replicated. Since every cell division relies on this process, it makes sense that this would lead to the degradation of these cells over a lifetime. Every cell division makes our cells a little bit weaker. 

A second strand of new research comes from Dr. Tom Myers. Myers specializes in anatomical tissue training. He describes the human body in terms of a structure called fascia that connects all muscles and tissues throughout the body. He describes how throughout life we get less and less liquid, though. As a zygote, humans are roughly 98% water. As a newborn, roughly 90% water. Throughout life though, this percentage continues to decrease all the way down to below 70%. This lack of hydration leads to a drying of the tissues that connect the tissues of the body. 

And so, from a modern perspective, aging is due to the deterioration of cells over a lifetime. There is a range in animal lifespan dependent on the size, environment, and given behavioral adaptations for that type of organism. New research seems to indicate that there are also genetic and anatomical components to aging. It seems that through the process of cell division, our DNA gets shorter and shorter, which progressively can accumulate to the aging process. Also, that tissue gets dehydrated over time, which leads to deterioration. 

Compare

It seems to me that Aristotle is similar to modern conceptions of aging in at least four ways. First, that there is a material cause that is responsible for the aging process. Second, the environment and size of the organism are important factors that correlate to their lifespan. And third, he has some interesting biological details that seem to be upheld today. 

The first comparison is in strategy. Both Aristotle and Modern depictions of life spans think that there is a material cause in the thing that causes the aging process. The fact that modern science posits material causes only is unsurprising. Aristotle, who is famous for positing four causes of things, takes a surprising turn by emphasizing the material cause here. His reasoning is sound though. Plants and animals are made up of material things, and so their lifespans will be dependent on the material processes that make up that organism. 

The second comparison is that both conceptions of lifespan see size and climate as factors at play here. While the modern perspective thinks this is exhaustive, Aristotle thinks there are more factors. But, it is interesting that these are the two factors that Aristotle spends the most time on. Clearly then, he thinks these are very important factors to clear up to get a solid answer on this issue. A further comparison can be embedded in this one: both perspectives hold that there are odd exceptions to these factors. Aristotle gives the example that horses are larger than men, but don’t live as long. Magalhaes describes how behavioral adaptations explain these quirks. Regardless, though, both perspectives argue that while the factors are helpful guidelines, they are not absolute. 

The third comparison is not related directly to the topic of aging, but more reflective of the peripheral biology of both perspectives. I think there are some fascinating similarities worth articulating here. One is the idea of R-selected species. In modern biology, species can be split based on their reproductive patterns. Some species live longer lives, parent more, and reproduce multiple times over their lifetime. These are classified as K-selected species. R-selected species, then, are species that reproduce lots of offspring all at once, live shorter lives, and more than likely only reproduce once in their lifetime. Magalhaes describes how since r-selected species are likely to be prey, they are evolved to have this reproductive strategy. Aristotle recognizes that animals can be classified by reproductive strategy. His cause for their shorter lifespan is different: that their frequent copulation leads to quicker dryness of the fluid he posited. Although he doesn’t apply an evolutionary cause, it is interesting that he recognizes a difference in reproductive strategies and that it seems to have an impact on lifespan. 

Another area that fits under this point is Aristotle’s description of whether cold climate animals live as long as warm climate animals. Aristotle says, “it happens that animals with little or no blood are in northerly regions either entirely absent (both land and water animals) or, when they do occur, they have a smaller and shorter life.” Although there is disagreement here between Aristotle and Magalhaes on which organisms live longer, the fact that Aristotle thinks that the unique operation of the biological systems of these organisms contributes to their lifespan is eerily similar to Magalhaes’s description of the metabolic rates of these organisms affecting their lifespan. 

The fourth comparison is between Aristotle and Dr. Tom Myers. The perspectives of these two are alarmingly similar. Both hold that the deterioration of the liquid that makes up organisms causes the aging process. The older an organism gets, the more they dry up. While Aristotle is hesitant to prescribe a name to this liquid, Myers is comfortable just sticking with water and its relations to the tissues of the body. Regardless of this terminological difference though, they are very similar here. 

In conclusion, we’ve seen a lot that is similar between Aristotle and modern conceptions of aging. First, there seems to be a material cause. Second, size and environment are important factors. Third, there is some similar use of distinctions in biology between Aristotle and the moderns. Fourth, Aristotle seems to be very closely aligned with modern research on fascia tissue and its relationship to dehydration and the aging process. Now, let’s look at how Aristotle differs from today’s perspective. 

Contrast

I think that Aristotle can be contrasted from modern conceptions of aging in three ways. First, his material cause is different. Second, his list of factors is longer. Third, his peripheral biology has some differences from modern viewpoints. 

I made a comparison in the previous section between Aristotle and modern biology on the point of a material cause being at play in the process of aging. I am putting this as a contrast here because the material cause given is different. Modern biology posits cells as the basic unit of structure and function for living things. Aristotle did not have access to microscopes, and so could not use cell theory as his material cause. I think an argument can be made that Aristotle’s description of “a humid element” that is “neither easily congealed nor easily dried up” could be applied to cells. Cells, after all, are mostly liquid, and can be found in abundance in every part of any living thing. I will not try to make that point, though. Rather, we will leave it that both parties posit a material cause, but do not have the same conception of what that material cause is. 

The second contrast is that Aristotle thinks that there are more factors at play than just size, environment and behavioral adaptation. In addition to these factors, Aristotle thinks that it is helpful to analyze whether the animal is aquatic or terrestrial along with bloodless or sanguineous. This demonstrates Aristotle’s knowledge of the animal kingdom, as the difference between open and closed circulatory systems is still fundamental to classifying organisms. For our purposes though, we only need to note that there is a difference here. 

Third, is that Aristotle has some peripheral biological reflections that are off the mark. Aristotle argues that warm climate animals live longer than cold climate animals. Magalhaes gives examples of organisms in these areas that live extraordinarily long lives, and credits this to their slower metabolic rates. So, while they both appeal to some similar biology here, they differ in their conclusion on which organisms live longer. 

Conclusion

In this paper, I have compared and contrasted Aristotle’s perspective with the modern perspective of what causes organisms to have set lifespans. Aristotle is similar to modern perspectives in holding that material causes are fundamental here, that size and environment are major factors in determining how long a species will live, and in some of his periphery biology. He seems to compare very nicely to research on the relationship of fascia tissue and dehydration in the aging process as well. Aristotle differs from modern biology in describing what the material cause is, in his listing of relevant factors, and in some of his periphery biology. If you can look through terminological differences that Aristotle has with us, he is an incredibly clear and valuable voice for biological science. 

Bibliography

Aristotle. On Length and Shortness of Life found in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Volume 1. 

Translated by G.R.T Ross, Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. Print. 740-744. 

Kumar, Abbas, Fausto, and Mitchell. Robbins Basic Pathology 8th Edition. Philadelphia, PA: 

Saunders Elsevier, 2007. Print. 28-29

Joao Pedro de Magalhaes. Why do Animals Have Different Life Spans? Found at 

https://ed.ted.com/lessons/why-do-animals-have-such-different-lifespans-joao-pedro-de-magalhaes 

Dr. Tom Myers. Are You Aging or Just Drying Out? Wellcast Academy. Found at 

https://youtu.be/wL1ZVarr1R8 

Reece, Urry, Cain, Wasserman, Minorsky, and Jackson. Campbell Biology 9th Edition. San 

Francisco, CA: Pearson Education. 2005. 319.