Critique of Rosemary Ruether's “Birth Control and the Ideals of Marital Sexuality”
Summary of Ruether Essay
I will begin my critique by summarizing the text as strongly as I can. Ruether begins by explaining how many of the terms of this debate are muddy. She cites how terms like relational value and formal cause of procreation are read in different ways by both sides of the debate. She goes on to describe the purposes of marriage. She thinks there are two: procreation and unity of the spouses. Next, she describes the ideals of both of these ends of marriage. These are successful procreation during the sexual act for the first end, and total free and loving exchange between the spouses during every sexual act for the second end. Next, she describes reasons why these ideals are unreachable in the world. After this, she goes on to describe the different means of avoiding pregnancy and how they each fit with the two ends of marriage. She begins this section by removing total abstinence (when not intending to have children) from the table. She argues that not only is this largely impossible, it's bad for both ends of marriage. Unitive is rather obvious: the couple is refraining from sexual union. But also the procreative end, because procreation and education go hand in hand. When the unitive bond between spouses is broken, the nurturing aspect of education is also broken.
It's clear then that some form of contraception is necessary. It is unhealthy for spouses to refuse sexual communion for long periods of time. The four options are sterilization, temporal contraception, technological contraception, and medicinal contraception. Sterilization is off the table because it is permanent. It removes the freedom to choose life in the future. Temporal contraception, like the rhythm method, is impersonal, anxiety inducing and ineffective. Technological contraception has the drawback of being “aesthetically distasteful.” However some technological means allow for the act to reach completion, so these seem better. Also it's not clear to Ruether how this distastefulness is unnatural. Rather, it seems more like an aid (like reading spectacles).
She concludes the essay by describing further flaws in the rhythm method. I view this section as largely seeking to respond to the arguments from the pulpit. She views the argument that the rhythm method as an ascetic discipline is problematic and misplaced coming from clergy. She also describes how the refusal of contraception makes Catholics sex obsessed. And lastly, she concludes with a clever image: to refuse to smile when you are happy is simply not healthy.
I think that this is a thoughtful and well written defense of the use of oral and technological contraceptives. Her description of the rhythm method as a temporal contraception is clever. I also think her consideration that the ideals of marriage are very difficult to achieve should be taken seriously. Despite her thoughtfulness, I ultimately disagree with her fundamental points. I will now critique Ruether’s Essay.
Critique of Ruether Essay
I think there are several serious problems in this essay. First, I think Ruether is wrong to assume that marriage has two ends. Second, Ruether uses a conception of freedom that is misguided. Third, the view that because the ideals are arduous, so we should lighten them, is not a good argument. Fourth, her subtle critiques of natural law miss the mark. Fifth, she holds a consequentialist view that evil may be done if it bears good fruits. Sixth, she holds that the rhythm method is a form of contraception. I will expound on each of these points.
The first and fundamental mistake that Ruether makes is assuming that marriage has two ends. This is a common trope today even from within the Catholic Church. I think Aquinas has a better explanation of the nature of marriage. St. Thomas argues that “the form of matrimony consists in a certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered. And the end of matrimony is the begetting and upbringing of children: the first of which is attained by conjugal intercourse: the second by the other duties of husband and wife, by which they help one another in rearing their offspring.” We see here that the union of spouses is not a goal of the marriage, it is the form, essence or nature of the marriage. It’s what a marriage is! The goal is to beget and educate offspring from this union.
Notice that Aquinas does hold that the union of spouses is attained by intercourse. However, since this is the form of the marriage and not an end, it doesn’t need to be continually sought for a marriage to thrive. Rather, the couple should be aiming at begetting and raising offspring to the worship of God. Instead of viewing a marriage as something seeking unity, we should view it as a unity seeking children and their proper rearing. While defending this view would require exploring and defending Aristotle’s four causes, at the very least this alternative is just as viable as the one she assumes. At the most, it casts serious doubt on her heavy leaning on the unitive aspect of marriage over and above the procreative aspect.
A second problem in Ruether’s essay is her use of the term freedom. I think page 78 is a clear example of this. Ruther describes how using contraception is the only way that a married person can be free, since they are having children only when they concretely choose to. This view of freedom follows what Servais Pinckaers calls “freedom of indifference.” In essence, it's the view of freedom as not tied to human happiness, but rather as freedom from external influences. In this view I am free to play the piano when I don’t have conditions which prevent me from playing the piano. This is Ruethers vision of freedom. Nature and economic situations are all impediments to me choosing what I want. My will imposes itself on reality. In the context of marriage, then, my partner and I should have total control over when children come about from our sexual union, without the inhibitions of morality, economics, or human nature.
This contrasts with “freedom for excellence.” In this freedom, in real freedom, we are tied to human nature and to what will make us happy. Being constrained by the circumstances of human existence is not an enemy of freedom, rather it is the condition for it. Only because we were made a certain kind of thing with particular ends can we become more and more excellent. Returning to the piano example, I am free to play the piano only if I have trained and perfected my abilities as a pianist. In the same way, I am free to have and raise a child excellently when I submit to the realities of human nature and have grown and perfected my own human abilities. Rather than trying to control my situation, I submit to the Providence of the God who governs all things down to the existence of every moment, and have children according to the excellences I have achieved through growth in virtues. By exercising virtues, spouses work together to have children as they see appropriate and through appropriate means. This is living a marriage excellently. This is a free marriage.
A third problem with Ruethers essay is her view that because we are not able to reach the ideals of marriage, we need to lighten the means to reach these ideals is mistaken. In no other situation does this line of reasoning work. Imagine a person who reasons: it is difficult to reach the ideal of telling the truth, so I must be able to lie in situations where it's really difficult to tell the truth. We would judge that person’s reasoning to be mistaken. Ruether is correct that it is difficult for married couples to balance having children in a virtuous way and being intimate to a satisfactory degree. It doesn’t follow from this that we can use illegitimate means to balance these things though. Rather, we should seek to grow in virtue so as to balance these things appropriately. It is interesting that she describes a comfortable amount of children at her time (1964) as between two and five children. As contraception has become more and more accepted in society, this number has shrunk dramatically. Most families have less than 2 children. In addition, marriages have suffered, divorce has become widely prevalent and pornography is used by a large percentage of people. Perhaps her argument can be flipped on its head. Even under the ideal circumstances of a contraceptive heavy culture, humans are too selfish to use the tool appropriately, and so we shouldn’t bother.
Ruether has another problem, though. While she doesn’t address natural law theory directly, she makes a couple subtle jabs at it. I’m thinking of two places in particular. First, in her defense of traditional contraceptives, she compares them to an aid like reading glasses. Second, in her conclusion, she describes how unhealthy it would be to refuse to smile when one is happy. This is an analogy pointing to the absurdity of squelching natural desires for intimacy because of ethical norms. Towards the first point, I think Ruether just flat misses the mark. Contraception is not an aid towards the ends of marriage (presupposing that there are two). The purpose of contraception is to prevent conception, which is the primary end of the marital act. It would be akin to saying that ear plugs are aids in hearing. Towards the second point, I will respond in the following way. Human beings are rational animals. Smiling, or feelings of happiness, are parts of our animal nature. Since the rational nature is higher, it governs the lower parts of our nature. There are circumstances where it isn’t appropriate to smile. If someone tells you a funny joke during a funeral, it is appropriate to hold that smile back. Reason should govern over the passions. In the same way, if prudence demands abstaining from sexual intercourse for a valid reason, it should govern the passion of sexual intimacy which comes from our animal nature. To be clear, I am not saying that our animal instincts and natures are bad, just that they need to be governed by our higher rational nature.
The fifth problem that I find with Ruether’s essay is that she is expressing a consequentialist view of the matter. She leaves the question of whether contraception is licit off the table. Rather, she is seeking to see which route will have the best consequences. This is not how one should proceed in ethics. The primary judgment in an ethical question is: is this action right or wrong? It is not for us to decide what consequences are best. We may never do evil that good may come. We aren’t that good at judging the future anyways. Rather, we should start with asking whether an action is in keeping with human nature or not, and then proceeding to the more circumstantial elements. Contraception is wrong because it cuts against the purpose of sexual union. It is a violation of human nature. Even using consequentialist reasoning though, we have seen multiple decades now of widespread contraceptive use. The results have been disastrous. People don’t want to get married, marriages don’t last, marriages don’t produce as many children, use of pornography is rampant, and females are seen as objects for gratification widely in first world cultures. These are not good consequences.
A 6th problem in this essay is that Rosemary Ruether holds that the Rhythm Method is a form of contraception. This can be seen in her list of types of birth control. Also, in her introduction in which she states, “it is difficult to see why there should be an absolute moral difference between creating a spatial barrier to procreation and creating a temporal barrier to procreation.” The moral difference, of course, is in the nature of the act. In one case you are actively stifling the natural end of sexual union, in the other case you are not. If I could give an analogy: the rhythm method is like inviting someone to a wedding who you know is probably unable to come, whereas contraception is sending them an invitation telling them they are unwelcome.
As is common in ethical debates today, most of the disagreement is actually in the basement. By this I mean, many of the problems with Rosemary Ruether's essay can be traced below the level of ethics to the levels of metaphysics and anthropology. Because she has her theory of causality wrong she posits there can be two ends of marriage which are competitive, and no formal cause. Since she misunderstands the nature of the human being, she misses on her attacks on natural law and gets freedom wrong to a devastating degree. These fundamental philosophical problems bubble up to the surface as ethical errors of consequentialism, a rejection of a notion of human excellence (virtue) and a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between contraception and the rhythm method. With this, I conclude my critique.
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