Jordan
Phillips
Logic
and Epistemology: Final Project
Why
Saint Thomas doesn’t have a Mind Body Problem
Introduction
In this presentation, my goal is twofold. First, to articulate
the mind-body problem. Second, to explain why this problem does not exist for
the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas. To do this, I will begin by defining the
mind-body problem. Next, I will explain what the problem is, and what
philosophical changes it stems from. Then, I will explain why such a problem is
absent for Saint Thomas. When I have concluded, I hope that I have given a fair
explanation of the problem and properly described the thought of Saint Thomas
Aquinas on the matter.
Definition
Dr. Edward Feser in his book Philosophy of Mind: A Short
Introduction gives a definition of the mind-body problem in his glossary.
He says, “the mind-body problem is the problem of explaining what the
metaphysical relationship is between mental and physical phenomena.”[1] Dr. Margarita Veta gives a
similar description, saying that it is the problem of reconciling how the
physicality of the body can be reconciled with an immaterial mind. She goes on,
though, to give an example of how hearing a joke (a physical process) can
result in us finding it humorous (a mental act) and resulting further in
contractions of our diaphragm, or laughter (a separate physical process).[2]
Dr. Feser expresses difficulty in defining the mind-body
problem. He thinks that simply by defining it, we are likely to smuggle in
Descartes metaphysics which separates mind from body. He says, “to characterize
it as the problem of explaining how immaterial mental substances can interact
with the body seems to presuppose the truth of dualism; while to characterize
it as the problem of explaining how mental processes are produced by physical
processes in the brain seems to assume the truth of materialism.[3] As we will see, the
metaphysical underpinning is the issue here, and so we cannot presuppose one
thinkers metaphysics without evidence.
Explanation of Mind-Body Problem
Dr. Vega prescribes this problem as coming to us from
Descartes. The cause, as she sees it, is that he thought that not only were the
mind and body of more than one nature, but that they are almost opposite entities.[4] Since there are two
different natures at work in us, we need to explain what their relationship is.
Paul Chutikorn gives a similar explanation of the problem.[5] He agrees that this problem
comes down to us from Descartes, and particularly from his view of the human
being having two different natures. For Chutikorn though, this stems from
Descartes emphasis on the human being as a thinking thing, in conjunction with
the dualistic natures at work in man. Because Descartes wants to hold up man as
a thinking thing, he is compelled to see “the total essence of the human person
was the mind.”[6]
Even with this emphasis though, Descartes sees that these two natures are
connected, and thinks that we need to explain how. However, as Chutikorn sees
it, Descartes never found a way to connect these two natures, and so was left
with a dualistic account.
Dr. Feser explains the problem in a different way.[7] He comes at the problem
from the perspective of Aristotle’s 4 causes. Aristotle posited that there are
four ways a thing could be a cause. You can have a material cause, which causes
something by making up the materials it is made of. So, wood would be the
material cause of a wooden chair. The second cause is the efficient cause, this
is causing in the sense that we tend to think of it: causing something to be a
certain way by making or moving it. In the wooden chair example, the person who
constructed the chair would be the efficient cause. A third way to be a cause
is to explain what the thing is. This is called the formal cause. For the
wooden chair, the formal cause would be chair-ness. The fourth and last cause
is the final cause. This cause is meant to explain the purpose of a thing. The
purpose of the wooden chair would be to sit in.
Dr. Feser agrees with the previous thinkers in that
Descartes posits two distinct substances that make up the human person: body
and mind. He puts it into the terms of these four causes though.[8] The human being has these
4 causes as well. The material cause of the human being is the matter that he
is made of. The formal cause is the soul which animates the body. Descartes wants
to scrap these two causes and focus solely on the efficient cause, or how these
distinct substances of mind and body interact with each other. Once you’ve
determined that these two substances are separate, it’s easy to see why Descartes
views them as acting on each other rather than coordinating in sync. In this
way, they are efficient causes which continue to act on each other. The question
is how.
Now while Chutikorn thought that Descartes couldn’t
answer this question, Feser thinks that he does have an answer, at least in
practice. That answer being the famous phrase “a ghost in a machine.”[9] If the mind has the predominant
place, and the mind and body are constantly vying for priority, its feasible
that this is the result for Descartes. Feser ties us back to these four causes
of Aristotle. But first, he gives an example of a spirit haunting a body. When
we picture this we see that the body is subject to the spirit. The body
basically becomes a haunted zombie. In a similar way, Descartes dualism leaves
us with this perspective. Feser concludes, “That is the only kind of
interaction that the soul and body would be capable of if the only way they can
relate is by efficient causation rather than formal causation.”[10]
St. Thomas’s Perspective
As I hinted at above, this problem is the result of
Descartes metaphysics, with which Saint Thomas Aquinas would take exception.
Dr. Feser argues from the phenomenon of our experience.[11] He thinks that our
experience scoffs at the notion that there are two separate substances at work
in us. He gives a couple examples. When we move, it doesn’t feel as if our mind
is dragging our body like a puppet but move that they are acting in sync. Similar
with our perception, we don’t feel as if we are reading information off the top
of our brain, but that we are experiencing reality. He also hints at a thought
experiment. If we were to think about what existence would be like if our body
and soul were united, we would imagine something very similar to what our
experience is. He summarizes the problem with Descartes view by saying, “The
interaction problem, you might say, is not the problem of explaining how soul
and body interact, but rather the problem of putting yourself in a position (as
Descartes does) of having to think of the relation between them as a kind of
interaction in the first place.” So for Feser, this isn’t an actual problem,
but one invented by bad metaphysics.
Chutikorn gives a similar synopsis of why Saint Thomas
would take exception to Descartes metaphysics.[12] He makes clear that Saint
Thomas sees the human person as being a united single substance, made up of two
principles. These two principles being soul and body. Soul comprising intellect
and will (which would be analogous to Descartes mind). The body would be
analogous to Descartes view of the body. Chutikorn even wants to make the point
that Thomas doesn’t totally disagree with Descartes, in that he believes the intellect
and body are distinct from each other. However, this distinction doesn’t go so far
as to count them as two different substances like Descartes. So again, Thomas’s
metaphysics don’t allow for the interaction of the mind and body to be a
problem, because they are united.
Dr. Vega gets at the problem in a way similar to Dr.
Feser.[13] She says that Descartes
views matter as a separate substance that exists on its own. In contrast to
Aristotle and Aquinas who view matter as existing in potency and needing a
substance to bring it into actuality. This substance that brings things into
actuality is the formal cause. So, in her reading of St. Thomas, the mind body
problem doesn’t exist because the potency of matter works in coordination with
actuality of its formal cause. She says, “there is a mutual reciprocity between
what is in potential and what grants actuality.”
Father Thomas Petri describes Thomas’s view of the
unity of the body and soul as a single substance and its comparison to
Descartes as well.[14] He mentions in passing
that this is hard to articulate today because the language we would use to
articulate it has been hijacked by Descartes philosophy. This is a similar
point to Feser’s that was made in the definition section of this presentation. He
describes the human person succinctly by saying, “For Saint Thomas the soul and
the body are not things on their own. They are principles that comprise you.
That’s why he says the human person is a composite of body and soul.” We see
here with Father Petri what we have seen with all of our thinkers, that this
problem of the interaction of the mind and body only exists for someone who
posits that they are separate substances. This is something that St. Thomas
finds inexplicable.
Conclusion
My objective for this presentation was to define and
explain the mind body problem and to show why this problem doesn’t exist for St.
Thomas Aquinas. We have seen that if you posit that the human person is
comprised of two separate substances you fall into a problem of not knowing how
these two substances interact with each other. These two substances are, first,
the immaterial mind which coordinates the action of the second, the material
body. For St. Thomas though, this is an incorrect view of the human person. We
should not posit that the mind and body are separate substances but two
principles of the same substance (the person). If we see these two parts as
united, we have no problem in seeing how they interact.
Works
Cited
Chutikorn,
Paul. “A Thomistic Critique Of Cartesian
Dualism” Web. https://thomistica.net/essays/2018/11/9/a-thomistic-critique-of-cartesian-dualism
16 July 2020. Uses the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas to rebut the dualism
put forward by Descartes. Pertinent because of comparison between two thinkers.
Feser,
Edward. “Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Web. https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/09/mind-body-interaction-whats-problem.html
16 July 2020. Brief summary of why Thomists don’t have a mind body problem, and
comparison to the problem as seen by Cartesian’s. Pertinent because it
addresses the very question to be answered by the presentation.
Feser,
Edward. “Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction.” (London, Oneworld
Publications, 2005). 192, 15-38. A definition of the mind-body problem, along with
ways to answer the supposed problem. It is pertinent to my research because it
gives a clean definition and arguments against it.
Petri
OP, Fr. Thomas. “69. Thomism of the Body.” (Aquinas 101 Podcast, 2020). 44:50-49:55. 20 July 2020. Describes the Thomistic underpinnings
of John Paul II’s Theology of the Body. One such underpinning is Thomistic hylomorphism
which he compares against Descartes. Pertinent because of this comparison and
because of articulation of Thomas’s position.
Vega,
Margarita. “The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind-Body Problem.” DSPT
- Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aLLmtw1sQPw
Web. 16 July 2020. Lays out the need for a different answer of the mind-body
problem and argues for Aristotle and Thomas’s perspective on the matter.
Emphasizes the difference between the two groups thoughts on matters. Pertinent
because speaker clearly differentiates perspectives on mind body problem.
[1]
Feser, Edward. Philosophy of Mind. 192.
[2]
Vega, Margarita. The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind Body Problem. 0:36-1:02
[3]
Feser, Edward. Philosophy of Mind. 192
[4]
Vega, Margarita. The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind Body Problem. 0:06-0:36
[5]
Chutikorn, Paul. A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism.
[6]
Chutikorn, Paul. A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism. Paragraph 1.
[7]
Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem?
[8]
Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 2.
[9]
Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 6.
[10]
Feser, Edward. Mind-Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 6.
[11]
Feser, Edward. Mind Body Interaction: What’s the Problem? Paragraph 7.
[12]
Chutikorn, Paul. A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism. Paragraph 5.
[13]
Vega, Margarita. The Dumb Ox Speaks: The Mind-Body Problem.” 4:20-6:55.
[14]
Petri OP, Fr. Thomas. Thomism of the Body. 44:50-49:55.
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