The Classical Ontological Argument

The Classical Ontological Argument

Saint Anselm’s Argument and Gaunilo/Kant’s Objections

Introduction   

There are more than a dozen arguments for the existence of God. One of the most intriguing is called the ontological argument. It begins with a definition of God, a perfect being, and the fact that the concept of God exists in human minds. Since God is a perfect being, it would be better for Him to exist in reality and in human minds. So, as a perfect being, must exist in reality. As we can see the argument is utterly fascinating. It has been debated among scholars for almost a millennium, which shows the seriousness with which the argument is due.

I begin in section 1, by stating Anselm’s definition of God, along with presenting a description and formalized version of the argument. The definition Anselm gives is crucial to the argument. For Saint Anselm, God is that which nothing greater can be thought. Next, in section 2, I will defend the argument. Observing validity of the premises and whether or not the conclusion logically follows. Then, in section 3, we will look at the famous objections of Anselm’s contemporary, Gaunilo, who tries to show that the ontological argument proves too much and Immanuel Kant, who tries to show that existence cannot be used as a property. After the objections, I will look at the prevalent responses to the objections. I will also give my reasoning as to why Kant’s objection works, why Gaunilo’s objections do not work, and most importantly why Anselm’s argument does not work.

Section 1: The Argument      

            Only one term needs to be defined- God. Saint Anselm defines God as a being with which nothing greater can be thought. The argument is a reductio ad absurdum, which means it begins with an assumption Anselm disagrees with, then progresses to show that having this assumption is absurd when conjoined with other true propositions, and therefore this assumption is false. The argument can be formally put as follows.

P1. God exists conceptually, but not in reality.

P2. Existing in reality and conceptually, is greater than existing conceptually alone.

P3. A being with God’s properties and existing can be thought.

P4. A being with God’s properties and existing would be greater than God existing conceptually alone.

P5. A being greater than God can be thought.

P6. It is contradictory that a being greater than God can be thought.

C1. Therefore, it is false that God exists conceptually but not in reality.

P7. God exists conceptually.

C2. Therefore, God exists in reality.

Section 2: A Defense of the Ontological Argument

            The argument seems to work logically. P1 is the assumption for the reductio. Anselm is trying to prove that this claim is ridiculous by showing how poorly it fits with other true premises. P2 works because Being is greater than Non-Being. I think that this truth is intuitive. P3 is proved sociologically by the way that a vast number of people from a variety of religious backgrounds have professed a belief in a perfect being. Perhaps not articulated as that which nothing greater can be thought, but a perfect being nonetheless. P4 follows from P2 and P3. Existence is greater than non-existence. P5 follows from P3 and P4. P6 comes from Anselm’s definition of God (as a being with which nothing greater can be thought). This is the statement that contradicts Anselm’s assumed premise for the reductio, P1. C1 follows from P1, P5, and P6. P7 follows from P1. C2 follows from P7 and C1.

            The argument seems pretty airtight. However, as we will see there are serious objections. Gaunilo has a clever reductio ad absurdum showing that this line of thinking can be applied to anything. Gaunilo also makes a distinction between God existing conceptually, and God being thought of as a mere abstraction, like fiction characters. Immanuel Kant also has an objection that Anselm treats the existence of God (in reality) as a property (P3 and P4). But existence can’t be a property, because properties are contingent on existence.

Section 3: Objections to Anselm’s Ontological Argument

            We’ll start with the objections of Saint Anselm’s contemporary, Gaunilo. Gaunilo gave 4 criticisms to the Ontological argument. For our purposes we will focus on criticism’s 1 and 4, as 2 and 3 are weaker and easily answered. Criticism 1 is that just because something can be thought of, it doesn’t follow that it can be conceived. If the objection succeeds, premise 3 is undermined. Gaunilo states his objection like this, “For could I not say that all kinds of unreal things, not existing in themselves in any way at all, are equally in the mind since if anyone speaks about them I understand whatever he says” (Gaunilo, 313)? Take a married bachelor for example. Obviously this cannot exist, but Gaunilo asks, why can’t a married bachelor be conceived, since we understand what is being said.  

            Saint Anselm, since he was alive to see Gaunilo’s objections, responded as follows. If unreal things exist in the mind we can think of them intelligently. So Anselm would say that married bachelors are not like God because we cannot speak intelligently about married bachelors, but we can for God. After all, the western philosophical tradition, even in Anselm’s day, had a rich and well thought out conception of God.

            I find that Anselm’s reply soundly beats Gaunilo’s objection, once it is understood. Gaunilo’s objection seems very strong at the surface, that we can imagine all kinds of things coherently, even though they do not exist. It seems as though you can sneak any non-existent thing through the ontological argument, so long as you can think it. Take the married bachelor example. In Gaunilo’s view, things like a married bachelor can exist in the mind because we understand the terms married and bachelor. But, he misunderstands when Anselm says “exists in the mind,” to mean anything that can be imagined. However, Saint Anselm is not making this claim. Rather, by the phrase “in the mind,” means something that can be conceived, or comprehended (even if not fully). A concept that is not a logical contradiction. This is why I have used the term “conceptually,” rather than “exists in the mind” in my working of the argument. I think it avoids the confusion that Gaunilo had.   

            Now we must turn to Criticism 4, where Gaunilo uses a reductio ad absurdum. He uses the same argument as Anselm, but uses it to prove the existence of a perfect “Lost Island.” He says, a perfect lost island that exists in our minds isn’t as great as a lost island that exists in our minds and reality. Therefore, it must exist in reality, if it is to be a perfect Island. He’s trying to show that Anselm’s argument proves too much. That the ontological argument could be applied to any perfect, imaginary thing.

Anselm in his reply makes a distinction. God is a being with which nothing greater can be thought. God cannot be made more perfect. However the Lost Island could always be improved. It could always get closer to a perfect temperature/humidity. There could always be one more good person on the island. The perfect Island could always be a little bit bigger, and so on. This does not apply to God though. God’s attributes are goodness, power and knowledge. Since he is perfect these are at an absolute maximum. God is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing. It is impossible to be more morally perfect than all-good, more powerful than all-powerful, and more knowledgeable than all-knowing.

I also agree with Anselm’s response to this objection. There could never be an absolutely perfect island. It could always get a little bit better. The perfect island is only perfect in matters of taste. But God is not subjectively perfect, but objectively perfect. God is perfect in goodness, in knowledge, in power. Perfection comes from God. Whereas in Gaunilo’s case perfection is imposed on the island by already existing attributes, and our personal tastes.

Lastly, Kant objects that real being, or existence, is not a property. And that Anselm’s ontological argument treats existence as a property. Kant says that the ontological argument is fallacious because you could never have properties, if you do not exist. You could never say that a non-existing bachelor is handsome. Since he doesn’t exist, you could never prescribe attributes or properties to him. As Kant says, “To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of contradiction can then arise” (Kant, 338).

Anselm wasn’t around to answer this objection, but there is a critical response. Defenders of Anselm’s argument say, with contingent things existence is not a property. However, with necessary beings, existence is a property, since it is vital to what the being is. Remember, a necessary being is one that cannot fail to exist. Let’s take an example of our non-existing bachelor. We could say what if he is necessary, he cannot fail to exist. Why can’t necessary existence serve as an attribute? It seems as though necessity can be used as a property, because it is a positive description of part of a thing.

I do not think that this reply works though. This distinction simply does not get at the objection Kant is raising. Whether a being is necessary or contingent, all of its attributes cannot exist in reality if the being does not exist. Let us pretend that angels are necessary. To say that angels exist, still doesn’t describe them. We would still know as little about them as we do now. So to make this distinction, I think, is only a distraction. It seems to me that it equivocates to use the term “necessary being” to mean that it exists in reality. However, atheists agree that God is a necessary being, even if he does not exist. So necessary being, in the sense of this discussion, has to mean a being that if it exists in reality, it cannot fail to exist.

Conclusion

            We can see that the ontological argument of Saint Anselm is intuitive, and compelling. It is an argument for the existence of a greatest possible being, solely from a definition, and the concept in human intellects. We see that many of the instinctive objections that are raised are quite easily answerable. That the argument proves too much, and can be applied to anything is mistaken, because perfection belongs to God in a way that cannot be imposed on any other concept. But, upon deep inspection on the assumptions of the argument we see its lethal flaw. God’s existence cannot be treated as an attribute. Discussions about God’s perfection, and what that entails are irrelevant if the Being does not exist in the first place.

Works Cited

Anselm. “Proslogion.” PDF file. Print.

Gaunilo. “Pro Insipiente.” PDF file. Print.

Kant, Immanuel. “Critique of Pure Reason.” PDF file. Print.