Comparing
Aristotle and Aquinas on Friendship
Final
Essay: Exposition
Ancient
and Medieval Philosophy 605
By: Jordan Phillips
Introduction
In
this paper, I will explain the concept of friendship as it is developed in
Books 8 and 9 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I will also compare it to
Thomas’s application of these texts into Christian thought.[1] I will quote from the
Summa Theologica, the Summa Contra Gentiles, the Commentary on Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics and the Commentary on the Gospel of John.[2],[3],[4],[5] I will briefly give the
context for both thinkers works. I think this is important for putting their
thought in perspective. Next, I will show how they define friendship, and why
they think it is important. Then, I will discuss the different levels of
friendship, and how the objectives of the individuals involved mark each type. Lastly,
I will look at the characteristics of friendship. In this section, I will show
how Saint Thomas advances from Aristotle’s thought in two areas: Divine
Friendship and Marriage. I will also show how Saint Thomas builds off
Aristotle’s principles of friendship to describe Christian charity.
Context of Authors Works
The
goal of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is to find how to make men happy. He says
that he is looking for the goal for which all of our actions are conducted (particularly
those actions that are done for their own sake).[6] The answer to this is
happiness: “both the common people and the educated say [the highest good of
human action] is happiness.”[7] Now, since what makes man
special for Aristotle is his ability to reason, our happiness is going to have
to do with reasoning well.[8] Another way to put this,
is that man should be virtuous in order to be happy.[9] He goes on to describe
virtue and to differentiate virtues. It is in this context that we see his
discussion of friendship. He even says that friendship is a kind of virtue,
because it requires frequent actions of goodwill, which become habits and
eventually virtues.[10]
Friendship
is a subject of moral philosophy or finding the happy life for 3 reasons.[11] First, everybody needs
friends. Rich and poor, young and old, rulers and subjects, fortunate and
unfortunate all need to have friends. When we are struggling, we need help, when
we are doing well, friends can give us guidance for improvement, or fraternal
correction to keep us on the straight and narrow. Secondly, friendships are
built into nature because people have things in common. We come into the world
with familial and societal relationships, and these only increase as we make
decisions throughout our lives. These people that we are bound with are almost
natural friends. Aristotle even makes the point that we have things in common
with everybody. This is what all friendships can build from. Thirdly,
friendship is necessary for civic society. When citizens get along well,
society can do well; when citizens are in a state of unrest, society will be in
unrest.
Saint
Thomas Aquinas’s writings were meant mostly for academic audiences. They have
different goals. His commentaries were essentially transcriptions of his
classroom lectures.[12] His Summa Contra Gentiles
was meant to train missionaries in evangelizing other religions, as is implied
by the name of the work. His Summa Theologica was meant for Dominican Novices
in training of Theology.[13] His application of
Aristotle’s work of friendship is especially pertinent in his views of the
Christian virtue of Charity, but is also brought out to discuss the sacrament
of Marriage, and to describe salvation as will be seen towards the end of this
essay.
Definitions
Now
that we have put the author’s works in context, we will look at their
definitions of friendship, and explore why they think it is important.
Aristotle’s definition of friendship has 3 parts, all which follow from his
argumentation throughout the chapter. Friendship involves “men wishing good to
one another, that this fact is recognized by each, and that it be for the sake
of one of the reasons previously mentioned.”[14] We will investigate all
three parts of this definition.
The
first of these aspects is that friendship involves men wishing good to one
another. Thomas comments on this, “the good of a friend must be willed for his
sake and not for the sake of the one loving.”[15] We can see immediately in
Thomas’s interpretation of this, that he is applying it to charity. In his
first article on Charity in the Summa, he brings out several parts of this very
passage from Aristotle. As a matter of fact, he directly cites this section of
the Ethics. He draws out at least three elements: Aristotle’s comparison to
benevolence, his comparison to our affinity towards inanimate things, and the
central idea of the definition: wishing good to another.[16] We can see from this that
Thomas agrees with Aristotle’s notion of friendship as requiring goodwill
towards the other.
The
second element of the definition, that this goodwill be recognized by each,
requires further explanation. Aristotle wants to make a distinction between
beneficence and friendship. Both involve this good wishing towards the other.
Beneficence, however, doesn’t require that the other knows about the good
wishing. Friendship does require this. He says, “they cannot be called friends
when unaware of one another’s feelings.”[17] For example, if I say a
prayer for a person who is struggling, but they aren’t aware of my doing so,
this is beneficence but not friendship. They have no way to take solidarity in
my wishing well for them. That’s not to say that this action isn’t virtuous, it
is. For Aristotle, it’s a separate virtue, but it isn’t friendship.
There
is evidence that Aquinas doesn’t agree with this. First, he places beneficence
in the virtue of charity in his Summa Theologica.[18] Secondly, in article 1,
he draws off Aristotle’s notion of friendship to define beneficence.[19] This seems to point to
Thomas wanting to include beneficence as part of friendship, and that the
mutual knowledge of both parties is not essential to the definition.
However,
if we move on in the same question to article three, he says that “we ought to
be most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.”[20] He goes on to list
kinsmen, citizens, and those who follow the same religion as examples. Although
Thomas doesn’t explicitly say this, I think one of the reasons he thinks
beneficence applies to those who are closest to us, is at least partially
because of the mutual knowledge of this goodwill. Especially in light of his
statement in article 1, “neither does well wishing suffice for friendship, for
a certain mutual love is requisite…this is founded on some kind of
communication.”[21]
So, I think Thomas can be interpreted as seeing this portion of Aristotle’s
definition as essential to friendship as well.
The
third aspect of Aristotle’s definition was “that it be for the sake of the
reasons previously mentioned.” In his commentary on this definition, Saint
Thomas interprets this to mean: “the good, the pleasurable or the useful.”[22] As we will see in the
following section, these are the three types of friendship that are based on
the objects we pursue in our relationships. This requires further explanation,
as it is a key to understanding much of Aristotle’s thought on friendship.
Three Types of Friendship
Since
there are three different kinds of things we look for in our friendships,
Aristotle posits that there must be three kinds of friendship.[23] The three things we look
for in relationships are utility (usefulness), pleasure and goodness (virtue).
Friendships of utility are those where “one does not love the other for the
other’s sake but only for the good they mutually gain.”[24] In the same passage, he
describes friendship of pleasure as “those who love for the sake of
pleasantness love for the pleasure they enjoy.” In contrast, friendship of
virtue, or perfect friendship, are those “who wish good to friends for their
sake…they do this for the friends themselves and not for something incidental.”[25] Let’s look at each of
these types in greater detail.
I
like to use an example for friendship of utility. This type of friendship is
like my relationship with a waiter at a restaurant. If I am nice to this
person, they are more likely to be more careful and do a better job serving me.
If I am a jerk to this person, I am less likely to get refills when I want
them. So, it is in my best interest to be nice to this person. We can see here
that ultimately, I am acting in my own best interest, and not the interest of
the waiter. This is what we see in friendships of utility. Both parties are
seeking some good to be received from the relationship.
These
relationships are not very deep and are easily dissolvable. If this waiter messes
up my order or doesn’t refill my drinks as often as I like, I may tip them
less, causing further strain on the relationship. This example shows what
Aristotle means by saying, “If the reason for the friendship no longer exists,
the friendship itself is dissolved.”[26]
The
same is true of the next level of friendship, friendship of pleasure.[27] These are easily
dissolvable for a similar reason. In this type of friendship, both parties are
seeking pleasure from the relationship. Aristotle uses the example of young
people. Young people, Aristotle thinks, “foster friendship mostly for pleasure.”
Because of this, their friendships dissolve as frequently as their pleasures
change: “they fall in and out of love the same day.” As a High School teacher,
I see this all the time. Students who are in and out of different relationships
and friend groups as their interests change. For example, during the fall,
football players tend to spend a lot of time with fellow football players. When
this sport ends, and they start basketball season, their friend group changes
to fit their new interest.
It
is easy at this point to look down on these types of friendship. After all,
they are self-seeking. However, we need these friendships, and they exist in
nature for a reason. We are creatures of need, so it’s not intrinsically wrong
to build friendships out of need. We also need a certain amount of pleasure. Aquinas
thinks that just as the body needs rest from physical labor, so does the soul
need rest. “This relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words and
deeds. It becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at
times.”[28] These friendships are
good, even if they aren’t the fulness of friendship.
Let’s
turn to what both thinkers consider the best friendship. Aristotle says, “perfect
friendship is friendship between men who are good and resemble one another
according to virtue.”[29] The difference between
the kinds of friendship, as we have said, lies in the objective of the
friendship. If we are looking for something, this is a friendship of utility.
If we are looking for pleasure, it is a friendship of pleasure. The objective for
perfect friendship is the others good. It isn’t about what the individual is
getting out of it. “People who wish good to friends for their sake are the
truest friends; they do this for the friends themselves and not for something
incidental.”[30]
Where the other two friendships were fickle, this one is strong. “Friendships
between such men remain as long as they are virtuous; and virtue is a permanent
habit.”[31]
There
are a couple more attributes to this type of friendship that Aristotle wants us
to be aware of.[32] First, he argues that this type of friendship
is most intense, because it is ordered towards a good life, which is our
highest good. Secondly, he wants us to be aware that these friendships are very
rare, because virtuous men are rare. Another reason for the rarity of these
types of friendships, is that they require a lot of time. We all know that to
develop trust, a lot of time together is required. Aristotle cites a proverb
that makes his point: “people do not know one another until they eat [a peck of[33]] salt together.”[34] A peck being a
substantial amount, implying a substantial amount of meals eaten together.
As
we will see in the next section, Aquinas is mostly interested in this type of
friendship. He doesn’t think that the first two even qualify as friendships. He
says, “friendships of this sort [utility and pleasure] plainly are not
friendships essentially but incidentally, because a person is not loved for
what he is but for utility or pleasure.”[35] In his Summa Theologica[36] he says, “If we do not
wish good to what we love but wish it for ourselves, it is love not of
friendship, but a kind of concupiscence.” He adds that we love all sorts of
inanimate things in this way, like “wine” and “horses,” but we would think it
absurd to refer to these things as friends. In the same way, then, we should
not consider friendships of pleasure or utility friends in the true sense.
Characteristics of Friendship
The
last section of this essay will look at a couple of the characteristics of
friendship from the perspective of Aristotle. In looking at the works of Saint
Thomas Aquinas we will view the areas where he takes Aristotle’s perspective
and relates it into Christian philosophy. The first Aristotelian characteristic
of friendship is the notion of equality. As we will see, for Aristotle,
friendship requires being able to give and receive in some kind of proportion.
Given his view of the world, this eliminates the possibility of friendship with
God. Saint Thomas has a robust understanding of how we can be friends of God
and of the person of Jesus. This view of equality of proportion also has
implications for the sacrament of marriage. The other characteristic of Aristotle’s
thought that we will look at is how the friend is another self. Aquinas expands
on this teaching in his view of Christian charity.
As
stated, we will start with the idea of equality as a prerequisite to
friendship. Aristotle starts by saying that this should be seen outside of the
purview of the three kinds of friendship because they have different “motives
for loving.”[37]
They can, however, be classed together because they all involve unequal
positions of the lovers. He gives the example of Fathers and Mothers, Sons and
Fathers, and Rulers and Subjects. These examples, he posits, cannot give each
other an equal return. A son can never give his father due love for bringing
him into being. However, he does think that when children are just to their
parents, a long lasting and deep friendship can be had.[38] Given that this is an
example made for the whole class, we can take this principle to apply to the
whole class. Namely, that although perfect proportion cannot be had in these
relationships, if the individuals act justly, a friendship of virtue can be
attained.
This
is an important takeaway regarding marriage. You will hear many commentators on
this subject say that Aristotle and Aquinas differ in that the former thought
that virtuous friendship between the spouses was impossible because of the
inequality of the sexes, and that Thomas corrected this teaching.[39] When we look at what
Aristotle is saying, this isn’t quite right. He does include the possibility of
virtuous friendship. It isn’t surprising that he doesn’t make this point clearer
than he does elsewhere, because virtuous friendship is rare in all cases.[40]
Aristotle
does think that the marriage relationship has clear motives for friendship of
utility and pleasure. For utility, he teaches that people “are more included by
nature to conjugal [friendship] than political society.”[41] The family is prior to
the state for Aristotle. The reason for marriage though, is that everybody in
the family has material needs, including children. And by nature, men and women
are equipped to fulfill these roles according to their sexes.[42] There is clearly an
element of utility in marriage. Aristotle also thinks that there is an element
of pleasure. Aquinas cites the “generative act” as a source of pleasure within
marriage.[43]
We could add deep conversation and recreation as other sources of pleasure.
However,
Aristotle doesn’t stop here. Just as we said above, friendships of virtue are
possible in unequal relationships, so long as there is a just giving of oneself
to the other. This friendship “can exist for the sake of virtue if the husband
and wife are virtuous, for each has his proper virtue and they can delight in
it.”[44] Now while Thomas doesn’t
correct Aristotle’s teaching in this regard as many commentators claim he does,
I think that he does strengthen his argument.
Thomas
says, “the greater the friendship is, the more solid and long-lasting will it
be. Now, there seems to be the greatest friendship between husband and wife,
for they are united not only in the act of fleshly union…but also in the
partnership of the whole range of domestic activity.”[45] Thomas here has taken two
key principles of Aristotle’s to strengthen Aristotle’s own position. First,
that the long-lasting friendships, are likely friendships of virtue. Marriage
is a long-lasting friendship. Therefore, marriage is a friendship of virtue.
Secondly, Aristotle thinks that a common life is the basis of friendship.[46] The more areas of life
that are shared, the more likely this is a friendship of virtue. Saint Thomas
is saying here, husband and wife share their whole life together domestically.
And so, Aquinas uses Aristotle’s principles to strengthen his own position, not
to supersede it.
There
is an area where Saint Thomas clearly does go beyond Aristotle in this regard
though. Again, for friendships of people that are on unequal footing, Aristotle
thinks that friendships are complicated. If there is too great a distance
between the two subjects, friendship seems impossible to Aristotle. This is
true of Kings and those in “humbler walks of life.”[47] However, it is most true
in the case of men with God.[48]
Saint
Thomas, having revelation, can go beyond this. Thomas thinks that because of
the incarnation, we are able to be brought into friendship with God.[49] This friendship is not
something that we merit on our own, but is a gift of grace.[50] And this love of God
needs to be extended to our neighbor, that they too may become friends of God.[51]
Thomas
also thinks that this friendship can be extended to friendship with the person
of Christ. One way is with Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. He takes
Aristotle’s principle that friends need to live a life in common,[52] to show that it is
necessary for Christ to be present in the Eucharist for us to have friendship
with him.[53]
In the same way that friends who eat much salt together, can build a deep
friendship; those who partake of the sacred meal of Christ’s body and blood,
can enter into deep friendship with Jesus. The Eucharist gives us the very life
of Jesus, and so in an ultimate way, we live a life in common with him. Thomas
thinks another way that we can have friendship with Christ if we follow
Christ’s commands with filial fear (as opposed to servile fear).[54]
This
is the major separation of Aquinas from Aristotle on this issue of friendship.
Aquinas thinking that friendship with God is possible, is something that goes
beyond what Aristotle could envision through philosophy. This is not surprising
though. Since, it is only because God has revealed himself to us, and became
man, that this friendship is possible. It isn’t that Thomas thinks that we earn
friendship with God. It is solely because of God’s action through Grace and the
incarnation that this friendship is possible.
Another
place where Saint Thomas goes beyond the thought of Aristotle, because of his
access to revelation, is the virtue of Charity. Aristotle doesn’t have a virtue
of Charity. He does lay a foundation for Thomas to understand Charity in a
deeper way though. Aristotle thinks that by living “according to reason”[55] as opposed to passion,
man loves himself rightly. Aquinas agrees with this, and says unfortunately
though, “Most men are such that they follow sense rather than reason.”[56] However, in either case
people do what they perceive to be in their best interests. It’s just that some
act virtuously, in accord with reason; others act viciously or incontinently
because they follow their passions.
But,
because Thomas believes that we are called to “love your neighbor as yourself,”[57] he thinks we can be friends
of God by loving our neighbor. He interprets this passage: “by the fact that
you love yourself, you love yourself in which you will good to yourself….so
also you should choose the good of righteousness for your neighbor.[58] Just like how we
naturally do what we can to help ourselves, we should do this for our neighbor.
This is charity, and this unites us to God. Just as in with the natural
virtues, we can improve on this virtue of charity by doing acts of charity,
which develop into habits, and the virtue itself. The difference is that this
virtue is infused in us by God,[59] where the others can come
about through repetition. Saint Thomas has taken Aristotle’s principle of
rightly ordered self-love, and shown how in the light of the Gospel, it can
give us an image of what it means to live charitably.
Conclusion
Aristotle shows a hierarchy of friendship that progresses
from usefulness to pleasure to virtue. His robust teaching on the
characteristics of friendship fit into his teaching about living a happy life.
Saint Thomas builds on this teaching because of his access to revelation. He
makes stronger Aristotle’s perspective on marriage. He describes the
possibility of friendship with God through Charity. Thomas has taken
Aristotle’s hierarchy and added a level of friendship with God which we should
all strive to obtain for ourselves, by cooperating with his Grace.
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Nicomachean Ethics in Introductory Readings in Ancient Greek and
Roman Philosophy. Ed. C.D.C. Reeve Patrick Lee Miller, Trans. Reeve.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2015. Print.
[2] Aquinas,
Thomas. Summa Theologica, Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican
Province. Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981. Print.
[3] Aquinas,
Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Trans. Vernon J. Bourke. Notre Dame, IN:
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[4] Aristotle
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[5] Aquinas,
Thomas. Commentary on the Gospel of John. Ed. The Aquinas Institute,
Trans. Fr. Fabian R. Larcher, OP. Lander, Wy: The Aquinas Institute for the
Study of Sacred Scripture, 2013.
[6] Aristotle.
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[7] Aristotle.
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see also Book 1, Lecture 9. Trans. Litzinger. 35.
[8] Aristotle.
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[9] Aristotle.
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[10] Aristotle.
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Trans. Litzinger. 491.
[11] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 1, 2-4.
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[12] 105.
How should we understand morality? With Fr. Dominic Legge. Narr. Matt Fradd. Pints
with Aquinas. 8 May 2018. Web. 4 July 2020.
[13] ST.
Prologue. Trans. Fathers. xix.
[14] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 2, 9. Trans.
Litzinger. 479.
[15] Aquinas,
Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1558. Trans.
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[16] ST
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[17] Aristotle.
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[18] ST
II-II, 31. Trans. Fathers.
[19] ST
II-II, 31, a 1. Trans. Fathers.
[20] ST
II-II, 31, a 3. Trans. Fathers.
[21] ST
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[22] Aquinas,
Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1561. Trans.
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[23] Aristotle.
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[24] Aristotle.
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[25] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 10-13.
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[26] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 3.
Trans. Litzinger. 482.
[27] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 7-9.
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[28] ST
II-II, 168, a 2. Trans. Fathers.
[29] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 10.
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[30] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 12.
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[31] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 13.
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[32] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 16-17.
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[33]
Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1582.
Trans. Litzinger. 487.
[34] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 3, 18.
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[35] Aquinas,
Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1566. Trans.
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[36] ST
II-II, 23, a. 1. Trans. Fathers.
[37] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 7, 2,4.
Trans. Litzinger. 499.
[38] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 7, 5.
Trans. Litzinger. 499.
[39] 63:
Aristotle’s 3 Types of Friendship, with Emily Barry. Narr. Matt Fradd. Pints
with Aquinas. 3 July 2017. Web. 4 July 2020.
[40] Aristotle.
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Trans. Litzinger. 494.
[41] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 12, 18.
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[42] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8, Lecture 12, 19.
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[43] Aquinas,
Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1723. Trans.
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[44] Aristotle.
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[45] SCG
3:II, 123, 6. Trans. Bourke. 148
[46] Aristotle.
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Trans. Litzinger. 491.
[47] Aristotle.
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Trans. Litzinger. 499.
[48] Aristotle.
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Trans. Litzinger. 499.
[49] ST
II-II. 23. 1. Trans. Fathers.
[50] ST
II-II. 24. 2. Trans. Fathers.
[51] ST
II-II. 25. 1. Trans. Fathers.
[52] Aristotle.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 9, Lecture 14, 6.
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[53] ST
III. 75. 1. Trans. Fathers.
[54] Aquinas,
Thomas. Commentary on the Gospel of John Chapters 9-21. 2011, 2015.
Trans. Larcher. 291, 292-293.
[55] Aristotle.
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Trans. Litzinger. 566.
[56] Aquinas,
Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1864. Trans.
Litzinger. 565.
[57] Matthew
22:39. RSV.
[58] Aquinas,
Thomas. Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew Chapters 13-28. 1819. Trans.
Larcher. 253-254.
[59] ST
II-II. 24. 2. Trans. Fathers.
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